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Volume 45 Winter 1980 Number 1
IMPROVING COMPETENCE IN THE MERCHANT
MARINE: SUSPENSION AND REVOCATION
PROCEEDINGS
EUGENE R. FIDELL "
I. INTRODUCMON
Although the public has become increasingly familiar with such func-
tions of the United States Coast Guard as water pollution control,' nar-
cotics interdiction 2 and fisheries law enforcement,3 and despite growing
concern over the condition of the United States merchant marine, little
attention has been paid to the agency's role with regard to the competency
and discipline of merchant mariners.4 Similarly, the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board is far better known for its work in the investigation of
aviation and maritime disasters5 than for its appellate functions with
"Partner, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby &, MacRae, Washington, D.C.; B.A.,
Queens College, 1965; LL.B., Harvard University, 1968. The author is indebted
to his colleague, Austin P. Olney, for assistance in the preparation of this article,
and to the several personnel of the U.S. Coast Guard and National Transportation
Safety Board who graciously cooperated with the author's research efforts. The
secretarial assistance of Mary C. Scheremeta and Eileen Pratt is noted with
appreciation.
1, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976); Exec. Order No. 11735, § 2, 38 Fed. Reg. 21243
(1973).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 100
S. Ct. 61 (1979); United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978); Car-
michael, At Sea with the Fourth Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. R.v. 51 (1977).
3. See, e.g., United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru No. 28, 395 F. Supp. 413
(D. Me. 1975), discussed in Fidell, Hot Pursuit from a Fisheries Zone, 70 Am. J.
INT'L L. 95 (1976); Fidell, Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act of 1976: The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REv. 513, 581-84 (1977).
4. 46 U.S.C. §§ 216 (b), 239, 239a-b (1976); 46 C.F.R. pt. 5 (1979). For ex-
ample, the otherwise admirable Gilmore and Black treatise has only the briefest
reference to disciplinary procedures. G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAw oF AD-
mIRALTY 988 & n.167 (2d ed. 1975). See also 1 M. NoRis, THE LAw oF SEAMEN
§ 87 (4d ed. 1970 8 Supp. 1978).
5. See 49 U.S.C. § 1903 (1976).
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respect to either airmen's or merchant mariners' licenses. 6 If a renaissance
is afoot for the merchant fleet, it is essential to review the procedures of
both of these agencies with respect to merchant mariner discipline and
fitness. The purposes of this article are to inform mariners, shipowners,
proctors in admiralty, and others interested in the maritime industry of
current federal administrative procedures for discipline in the merchant
fleet, and to suggest changes which might profitably be made in those
procedures.
II. COAST GUARD SUSPENSION AND REVOCATION
HEARINGS: PURPOSES AND STAKES
The problem of maintaining discipline on shipboard is as ancient as
the art of navigation. Those who go to sea tend to be more independent
types than their shorebound fellows,7 and the facts of shipboard life-tra-
ditionally cramped quarters, separation from families, exposure to the
perils of the sea-all seem to add to the difficulties of the setting.8 In short,
as Learned Hand observed, "[s]ailors lead a rough life."9 Small wonder,
then, that even the earliest maritime codes addressed themselves to the
problems of discipline, recognizing duties on the part of the mariner as
well as the master or shipowner.1°
Various techniques are available today to deal with breaches of dis-
cipline aboard ships. First, just as crime on a naval vessel may be punish-
able by the criminal process of a court-martial, some crimes committed on
the high seas on board American merchant vessels or by merchant ma-
riners may be criminally punished in the federal courts. 1 Indeed, under
some wartime circumstances, the court-martial may itself be a proper
forum in which to try misconduct by merchant mariners, although the
courts have tended of late to look with disfavor on this approach.
12
6. 49 U.S.C. § 1908 (a)(9) (1976); 49 C.F.R. pt. 821 (1978) (Rules of Prac-
tice in Air Safety Proceedings); 49 C.F.R. pt. 825 (1978) (Rules of Practice for
Merchant Marine Appeals from Decisions of the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard).
For a thoughtful and practical description of procedures applicable in airmen's
cases, see Hamilton, Appellate Practice in Air Safety Proceedings, 10 Sw. U. Rizv.
247 (1978). See also Kovarik, Procedures Before the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, 42 J. AIt L. & Coa. 11 (1976). For a summary of appellate procedures in
medical cases involving airmen, see Hamilton, Administrative Practice in Avia-
tion Medical Proceedings, 26 EMoRY L.J. 565. 581-85 (1977).
7. Commandant v. Desvaux, No. ME-62, slip op. at 16 & n.19 (N.T.S.B. Apr.
18, 1978) ("it has been our experience in reviewing Coast Guard decisions that
the master of a vessel is inclined to overlook a certain amount of hostile ex-
pression and even physical contact between seamen so long as it has not in-
volved bodily injury"), citing Commandant v. Bozeman, 1 N.T.S.B. 2279, 2281
(1971).
8. See generally Aguilar-v. Standard Oil Co., 818 U.S. 724, 727 (1943).
9. Jones v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 204 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1953).
10. See, e.g., Laws of Oleron arts. V, VI, XII, XIII, XX, reprinted in 30
F. Cas. 1171 (R. Peters ed. 1807).
11. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1115, 2191-2198 (1976); 46 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
12. Compare Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969), discussed in
Neutze, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilians in Vietnam, 24 JAG J. 35, 41-42
(Vol. 45
2
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At the other end of the spectrum, the availability of civil actions
against a wrongdoer (or shipowner)' 3 brought by a victim of misconduct
or negligence on shipboard must be counted as a disciplinary tool. The
delinquent mariner may find that he has opened himself, at least in theory,
to disciplinary steps by the master of the vessel under the terms of his
employment (the articles),14 and possibly by the union or pilots' associa-
tion of which he is a member.15 Somewhere on the spectrum between
criminal prosecutions and private civil actions lies the Coast Guard's
power to discipline merchant mariners.
The United States Coast Guard's role in the discipline of merchant
mariners is vital to the maintenance of competence within the shipping
industry. That more is needed' than purely criminal provisions is plain: A
criminal penalty may be proper in a case of misconduct, but it is ob-
viously inappropriate when the objectionable conduct amounts only to
simple negligence or unskillfulness. In an era of complex shipboard ma-
chinery requiring special skills from both seamen and licensed officers,' 6
a broader remedial system than a criminal trial is required. Further, in
an industry so clearly charged with a public interest, the existence of a
competent, well-disciplined merchant marine cannot be adequately en-
sured by sporadic private litigation. Vindication of this interest has
been entrusted in the first instance to the Coast Guard: The privilege of
sailing on American vessels has been made contingent upon possession of
a Coast Guard-issued license (for officers) or document (for nonofficer or
unlicensed merchant mariners),17 and the Service has been granted the
(1969) and United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 365, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970) with
McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Va. 1943), noted in 30 COPNE.L L.Q.
108 (1944) and In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 1944).
13. Disciplinary problems among crew members may expose the owners to
suit on grounds of unseaworthiness. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., 348
U.S. 386, 339-40 (1955).
14. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 595 (1976).
15. See 386 U.S. COAST GUARD L. BULL. 5, 9 (1968).
16. See generally Joyce, Men at Sea-Then and Now, 33 MARINE SAFETY COUN-
CIL PROC. 4 (1976).
17. 46 U.S.C. §§ 222, 224, 643 (c), 672 (i) (1976). The terminology for the
various evidences of status is extensive: officers (engineers and deck) and motor-
boat, ocean and radio operators receive licenses, 46 U.S.C. §§ 224, 229c, 390 (1976);
seamen receive documents (U.S. Merchant Mariner's Document, also known as a
USMMD or "Z" card) or a continuous discharge book (no longer being issued),
46 U.S.C. § 643 (a) (1976), and a certificate of service endorsed on the USMMD,
46 U.S.C. § 672 (i) (1976); Great Lakes pilots receive a certificate of registration,
46 U.S.C. § 216b (1976); and pursers and surgeons receive a certificate of registry,
46 U.S.C. § 242 (1976). For a useful discussion of the types of mariner documents,
see 422 U.S. CoAST GUARD L. BULL. 11 (1979). Cf. Laws of the Hanse Towns art.
XV, reprinted in 30 F. Cas. 1197, 1198 (R. Peters ed. 1807) ("All owners are forbid-
den to entertain any master unless he produces a certificate of his honesty and
ability, and that he quitted the service of the merchants he served last, with their
consent: if they do, they shall pay 25 crowns penalty.").
1980]
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power to take a variety of disciplinary steps in respect of such documents
and licenses.' 8
The statute under which the vast majority of mariner licensing dis-
putes arise, and which this article will discuss, is section 4450 of the Revised
Statutes (R.S. 4450). 19 This section authorizes the Coast Guard to conduct
investigatory hearings in any case where a mariner is "incompetent or has
18. 46 U.S.C. 3§ 214, 226, 228, 229, 239 (g), 239b (1976); see also 46 U.S.C.
§ 216b (c) (Great Lakes Pilotage Act of 1960) (revocation or suspension by Coast
Guard of Great Lakes pilot's license or document requires revocation or suspen-
sion of registration as pilot); Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-474, § 5, 92 Stat. 1471, 1488 (1978) (amending 46 U.S.C. § 391a; tankermen's
endorsements brought under R.S. 4450). Cf. 46 C.F.R. §§ 10.13-29, 12.02-19, 401.250,
401.600 (1979). For a discussion of selected foreign legislation on shipboard disci-
pline, see' Cadwallader, Discipline in British Merchant Ships, 2 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 147 (1970); Kijowski, Disciplinary Responsibility of Seamen Tin the Light of
East German and Polish Labor Laws, 20 MARINE TrcH. & MGT. (Technika i Gospo-
darka Morska) 56 (1970, English trans. ed. 1973). See also The Merchant Shipping
(Disciplinary Offenses) Regulations 1972, S.I. 1972/1294; Canada Shipping Act. ch.
29, 7 CAN. REV. STAT. ch. S-9, §§ 247, ch. 550 (1970); Navigation Act §§ 344, 372(Austl. 192); 2 Commercial Code [Neth. Maritime Law], art. 451e (Royal Neth
Shipowners Ass'n ed. 1960).
19. 46 U.S.C. § 239 (g) (1976). R.S. 4450 provides:
In any investigation of acts of incompetency or misconduct or of
any act in violation of the provisions of title 52 of the Revised Statutes or
of any of the regulations issued thereunder, committed by any licensed of-
ficeri or any holder of a certificate of service, the person whose conduct
is under investigation shall be given reasonable notice of the time, place,
and subject of such investigation and an opportunity to be heard in his
own defense. The whole record of the testimony received by such investi-
gation and the findings and recommendations shall be forwarded to the
commandant of the Coast Guard, and if that officer shall find that such
licensed officer or holder of certificate of service is incompetent or has
been guilty of misbehavior, negligence, or unskillfulness, or has en-
dangered life, or has willfully violated any of the provisions .of title 52
of the Revised Statutes or any of the regulations issued thereunder, he
shall, in a written order reciting said findings, suspend or revoke the
license or certificate of service of such officer or holder of such certificate.
The'person whose license or certificate of service is suspended or revoked
may, within thirty days, appeal from the order to the Commandant of the
Coast Guard. On such appeal the appellant shall be allowed to be repre-
sented by counsel. The Commandant of the Coast Guard may alter or
modify any finding of the investigation, but the decision of the Com-
mandant shall be based solely on the testimony received by the said in-
vestigation and shall recite the findings of fact on which it is based.
This article will focus on proceedings against Coast Guard licenses and
seamen's documents. Proceedings concerning licenses pursuant to the Great
Lakes Pilotage Act shall not be treated. Similarly, questions regarding the issuance
of documents or licenses will not be examined in detail. For articles dealing
with this topic, see B. SHIMBERG, LICENSING OF DECK AND OFFICR IN THE U.S.
MERCHANT MARINE (1969); Anderson, The First Step-Revised Licensing Program,
26 MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL PROc. 239 (1969); McLeaish, Licensing-A Programfor the Seventies, 26 MERCHANT MARINE COUNCIL PROC. 88 (1969); Reed, A New
Look at Licensing of Merchant Marine Officers, 26 MEaCHANT MARINE COUNSEL
PRoc. 43 (1969). The procedures for license issuance are significantly different from
those applied under R.S. 4450, although the two now coalesce at the level of the
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endangered life, or has willfully violated any of the provisions of Title 52
of the Revised Statutes or any of the regulations issued thereunder."2 0 Addi-
tionally, provision is made for revocation of documents of persons con-
victed in a court of record of violating a state or federal narcotics law, or
who have used or become addicted to narcotics, 21 and of officers refusing
to perform their duties after having joined a vessel.2 2 Other provisions
refer to suspension or revocation "upon satisfactory proof of bad conduct,
intemperate habits, incapacity, [or] inattention to . . . duties." 23 Thus,
administrative hearings pursuant to R.S. 4450 have broad jurisdiction over
a variety of subjects.
The number of persons who fall within the Coast Guard's regulatory
jurisdiction ,at any time is difficult to determine since many holders of
licenses and documents are employed in the merchant fleet only on a
seasonal basis. Some notion of the numbers involved may be gathered
from the fact that in fiscal year 1978, about 51,000 seamen's documents
were processed, and personnel records were maintained by the Coast
Guard with respect to 167,000 mariners.24 A more direct indication of the
magnitude of the disciplinary program is the fact that in fiscal year 1976,
4,096 disciplinary investigations were conducted by Coast Guard marine
inspection* investigating officers, 25 leading to hundreds of formal trial-
type hearings before administrative law judges.26
The stakes for which a merchant mariner plays in R.S. 4450 hearings
20. 46 U.S.C. § 239(g) (1976); see generally 46 C.F.R. pt. 5 (1979). Parallel
Commonwealth regulations may be found in Shipping Casualties and Appeals
and Re-hearings Rules, [1923] STAT. R. & 0. 535 (No. 762) [hereinafter cited as
British Rules]; Shipping Casualty Rules, [1955] 1 CAN. STAT. 0. & R. 429 (No.
1861) (1954) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Rules]; Shipping Casualty Appeal
Rules, [1955] 1 CAN. STAT. 0. & R. 427 (No. 1860) (1954); Navigation (Courts of
Marine Inquiry) Regulations, [1943] CoMmw. STAT. R. 847 (No. 53) (Austl.)
[hereinafter cited as Australian Rules].
21. 46 U.S.C. §§ 239a-b (1976). The Coast Guard has concluded that these
sections were not repealed by implication by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976), or the Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1972,
21 U.S.C. § 1180 (c) (1) (1976). 418 U.S. COAST GUARD L. BULL. 30-32 (1979).
Query ,whether §§ 239a-b apply also to motorboat operators. See 46 U.S.C. § 526f
(1976);, 46 C.F.R. § 10.20-13 (1979). Section 239a (c) refers to "any document
authorized by law or regulation to be issued to a merchant mariner." Is a licensed
motorboat operator a merchant mariner? But see 46 U.S.C. § 643 (a) (1976).
22. 46 U.S.C. § 240 (1976).
23. 46. U.S.C. § 226 (1976). See also 46 U.S.C. §§ 214, 228-229 (1976).
24. Dep't of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980:
Hearings-Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1979).
.25. Dep't of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1978:
Hearings.Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 313 (1977).
26. In the year ending June 30, 1973, Coast Guard administrative law judges
held oyer 600 merchant mariner hearings. 30 MARINE SAFETY COUNCIL PRoc. 213
(1973)..In the succeeding two years nearly 800 and over 650 hearings were held,
respectively. 31 MARINE SAFETY COUNCIL PROC. 196 (1974); 32 MARINE SAFETY
COUNCIL PROC. 165 (1975).
1980]
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are high. A Coast Guard hearing may lead to revocation of the seaman's
document or license, suspension for an extended period, a probationary
period during which the mariner may continue to sail, an admonition, and
in some cases, reduction in the grade of license held.27 A revocation does
not prevent eventual reapplication, but both it and a suspension without
probation will serve to keep a mariner "on the beach." For a person who
has sailed for an entire adult lifetime and knows no other trade, this may
have devastating emotional and financial effects.28
III. THE AGENCY; THE PLAYERS; THE RULES OF THE GAME
The initial proceedings conducted pursuant to R.S. 4450 may be best
understood by reference to two statements of policy enunciated by the
Commandant of the Coast Guard:
The suspension and revocation proceedings are remedial and not
penal in nature2 9 because they are intended to maintain stand-
ards of competence and conduct essential to... the safety of life
and property at sea by insuring that the licensed or certificated
persons continue to be qualified to carry out their duties and re-
sponsibilities.3 0 The regulations in this part shall be liberally con-
strued so as to obtain just, speedy and economical determination
of the issues presented.31
The nonpenal nature of the proceedings has been recognized by the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, 32 which has appellate jurisdiction in
such matters.3 3 The Coast Guard's regulations also note that the interests
vindicated by the proceedings include those of "passengers, crews, cargoes,
shipowners and the general public." 34 Taken together, these concepts and
interests provide a vantage point from which to survey the process. The
27. 46 U.S.C. § 229 (1976); 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-170 (1971). For an illustration
of downgrading of an officer under Canadian law, see Gamache v. Jones, [1968]
I Can. Exch. 345 (1967).
28. The gravity of the consequences is illustrated by Rechany v. Roland, 235
F. Supp. 79, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) and Juan v. Grace Line, Inc.; 299 F. Supp. 1259,
1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In addition to financial and other adverse effects, de-
licensing may cause a mariner to become ineligible for other privileges. See, e.g.,
46 U.S.C. § 216b (c) (1976) (loss of Great Lakes pilot registration); WAsH. REv.
CODE § 88.16.100 (1962) (ineligibility for state-issued pilot licenses); Mass. Div.
of Motorboats R. 24 (ineligibility for carrying passengers for hire).
29. Compare 24 Op. ATr'y GEN. 136, 142 (1902) with United States v. Fuller,
330 F. Supp. 303, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (R.S. 4450 proceedings treated as "of a
quasipenal nature") and Fredenberg v. Whitney, 240 F. 819, 824 (W.D. Wash.
1917). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 784 (1964). Australian
courts have also encountered the problem of characterizing a merchant marine
statute. See In re Hummel, 3 Queensl. L.J. & R. 50, 51 (1887); In re Medley, 28
Vict. L.R. 475, 490 (1902). Cf. The Corchester, [1956] 3 All E.R. 878, 888.
30. 46 C.F.R. § 5.01-20 (1979).
31. Id. § 5.01-25.
32. Commandant v. Gillman, No. ME-59, slip op. at 4-5 (N.T.S.B. Mar. 22,
1977); Commandant v. Payne, No. ME-61, slip op. at 5-6 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 9, 1978).
33. See generally text accompanying notes 158-177 infra.
34. 46 C.F.R. § 5.01-15 (1979).
[Vol. 45
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following discussion will describe in brief the agency selected to vindicate
these policies and interests, the personnel involved, and the rules under
which the proceedings are conducted.
The history of federal administrative proceedings to discipline mer-
chant mariners is ultimately traceable to the Steamboat Inspection Act of
1852,35 which, among other important provisions, empowered the local
boards of inspectors of the Treasury Department's Steamboat Inspection
Service to grant and revoke licenses of pilots and engineers. This early
system was supplanted in 1871 by more detailed procedures for discipline,
including the requirements of written notice and a formal hearing by the
inspectors.3 6 In time the Steamboard Inspection Service was joined with the
Bureau of Navigation and became the Bureau of Marine Inspection and
Navigation in the Commerce Department. 37 In 1936 the Bureau's "marine
boards" were given suspension and revocation jurisdiction over seamen's
papers held by unlicensed mariners.38 After being temporarily declared a
part of the Coast Guard in 1942,39 the Bureau was abolished and its duties
formally absorbed by that agency in 1946.40 In 1967, the Coast Guard was
transferred to the newly-created Department of Transportation. 41 In the
same year a National Transportation Safety Board was created and given
appellate review power in certain merchant marine cases.4 2 This body was
made independent of the Department of Transportation and its jurisdic-
tion expanded slightly in 1975.43
Disregarding these changes in agency control and sundry amendments
35. 10 Stat. 61 (1852). Cf. 5 Stat. 305 (1838) (owners and masters liable for
damages resulting from failure to employ properly trained engineers).
36. 16 Stat. 447 (1871). See generally H. BLoomFiELD, COMPACT HisTOyy oF
THE UNITED STATES CoAST GuARD 263-65 (1966); R. ELLIS, CoAsr GuARD LAW EN-
FORCEMFNT 29, 37-39 (1943).
37. 47 Stat. 415 (1932); 49 Stat. 1380 (1936).
38. Act of May 27, 1936 § 4, 49 Stat. 1380 (1936).
39. Exec. Order No. 9083, 7 Fed. Reg. 1609 (1942); see generally McCune
v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80, 87-88 (E.D. Va. 1943).
40. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1946, § 101, 11 Fed. Reg. 7875, 60 Stat. 1097 (1946).
The permanent transfer was not without problems. For a time R.S. 4450 hearings
were suspended while Congress debated whether to exempt the hearings from the
hearing examiner provision of the APA, thus continuing the wartime practice of
using Coast Guard officers as hearing officers. The controversy came about be-
cause Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1946, approved after the APA, apparently
unintentionally removed R.S. 4450 cases from an APA exception for hearings
authorized by statute to be held by a board of officials (the Bureaus "marine
boards"). See generally Conduct of Disciplinary Hearings by Coast Guard Com-
missioned Officers: Hearings on H.R. 2966 and S. 1077 before Subcomm. No. 3
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., ser. no. 17, at
76, 85 (1948).
41. 49 U.S.C. § 1655 (b) (1976).
42. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 5 (b) (2), 80
Stat. 931 (1966). ,.
43. Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-633, § 304 (a) (9) (B),
88 Stat. 2166, 2169.
1980]
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to the-underlying legislation,44 the twin fountainheads of modern federal
maritime discipline are section 4450 of the Revised Statutes4 5 and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).46 Section 4450 is the enabling
jurisdictional statute; the Administrative Procedure Act establishes the
procedural framework for the hearings.4 7
Presiding at an R.S. 4450 hearing will be a civilian administrative law
judge appointed under the APA, who will render an initial decision for
the agency.4 8 Also present will be the respondent merchant mariner, who
will be defending his right to his license or document. He.may be accom-
panied.by legal counsel or anyone else he feels will aid his cause.4 9 In
•practice, legal counsel may be an experienced proctor in admiralty, an at-
torney with the local legal aid service, or counsel provided by the mariner's
union.
Representing the Coast Guard at this adversary proceeding will be a
commissioned investigating officer, attached to a Marine Inspection or
Marine Safety Office.50 Several other officials may be indirectly involved in
the process. For example, the Chief Administrative Law Judge exercises' a
supervisory role over the administrative law judges who preside at R.S.
4450 hearings.5 1 In addition, the Commandant of the Coast Guard plays
a crucial role. He has the power to promulgate regulations and to decide
individual cases. 52 Although the initial power to decide cases has been
delegated to the administrative law judges,53 the Commandant also retains
44. 36 Stat. 1167 (1911); 49 Stat. 1381 (1936); 50 Stat. 544 (1937); Reorg.
Plan No. 3 of 1946, Il Fed. Reg. 7875, 60 Stat. 1097 (1946).
45. 16 Stat. 447 (1871) (codified in 46 U.S.C. § 239 (g) (1976)).
46. 5 U.S.C. ch. 551 (1976).
47. Van Teslaar v. Bender, 365 F. Supp. 1007, 1011 (D. Md. 1973); O'Kon
v. Roland, 247 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Although the- Coast Guard is a
military service, 14 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), certain of its functions are within the APA.
See, e.g., United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341, 347 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. 46 C.F.R. § 1.25 (b) (1979); Miller v. Smith, 292 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Unless the mariner consents or the case does not involve conflicting testi-
mony requiring a decision on the credibility of witnesses, the administrative lawjudge rendering the initial decision must have presided at the evidentiary hearing.
Van Teslaar v. Bender, 365 F. Supp. 1007, 1010-13 (D. Md. 1973).
49. See 5 U.S.C. § 555 (b) (1976); 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-45 (a) (1) (1979). But see
46 C.F.R. § 401.615 (1978).
50. A Marine Safety Office combines Captain of the Port and marine inspec-
tion functions. U.S. Comp. Gen., How Effective is the Coast Guard in Carrying
Out its Commercial Vessel Safety Responsibilities, No. CED-79-54, at 3 (May 25,
1979) [hereinafter GAO Report]. The investigating officer is the lowest ranking
member in a rather complicated chain of command which terminates with the
Commandant of the Coast Guard. See 33 C.F.R. § 1.01-20 (a), pt. 3 (1979); 46 C.F.R.§ 1.20 (b) (1979). The agency regulations do not suggest that a mariner may obtain
interagency review of prosecutorial decisions by ascending the chain of command,
id. § 1.20 (c), in contrast to license denial cases. See note 159 infra.
51. 46 C.F.R. § 1.10 (b) (1) (1979). Decisions in those rare cases in which the
Chief Administrative Law Judge presides enjoy no special weight. See In re
License No. 288507, 1969 A.M.C. 2141, 2153 (13th Coast Guard Dist. 1969).
52., 46 C.F.R. § 1.10 (a) (1979).
53. 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-190 (a) (1979).
[Vol. 45
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an important appellate jurisdiction which he exercises with the assistance
of various officers in Coast Guard Headquarters, including the Chief Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, the Chief Counsel and the Chief of Staff.54
There is also an Administrative Clemency Board in Headquarters which
considers applications for new or reissued licenses from persons whose
licenses or documents have been revoked or surrendered. 55
In some extraordinary cases the Commandant has reserved "the per-
sonal right to make the initial determination" as to the disposition, of a
mariner's document or license.5 6 However, this provision should p~ot be
interpreted as providing for personal review by the Commandant; rather,
it indicates only that the initial decision as to the disposition of the docu-
ment or license is lodged in the Headquarters procedure as opposed to the
administrative law judges. In all other cases the Maritime and International
Law Division of the Office of the Chief Counsel prepares a proposed de-
cision in cases appealed for the Commandant's consideration. 57
In addition to the participants listed above, active roles are played by
physicians of the United States Public Health Service who attend to the
medical needs of merchant mariners58 and who may recommend that a
54. These officers previously constituted a Permanent Board to Hear Oral
Argument, see Miller v. Smith, 292 F. Supp. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), but the Board
fell into disuse and no longer exists. See text accompanying notes 151-152, infra.
The Chief Administrative Law Judge does not participate in the review of ap-
pealed cases where he has presided at the hearing. Decision on Appeal No.
1441 (1964) (denying motion to disqualify Chief Examiner). This has not hap-
pened in recent years, so the question has little practical significance.
55. See generally Word v. United States, 223 F. Supp 614, 616 (S.D. Ala.
1963); Cruz v. Siler, Civ. No. 76-5348 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1978).
56. 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-190 (b) (1979).
57. 46 C.F.R. § 1.10 (c) (1) (1979).
58. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 246, 251 (a) (3) (1976); 42 C.F.R. pt. 32 (1978);
U.S. Public Health Service, Div. of Hospitals and Clinics, Operations Manual, pt.
B, ch. 1, § 2; G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, THE LAW OF ADIPnRALTY 301-02 (2d ed.
1975). A perplexing'aspect of R.S. 4450 proceedings is the ambiguous manner in
which the decision making authority between the Public Health Service and the
Coast Guard is divided when the mariner faces revocation on medical grounds.
See Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 780 n.3 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'g 280 F. Supp.
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (voluntary deposit case). For an enlightening review of the
overlapping roles of the Coast Guard and other agencies concerned with maritime
casualties and occupational health and safety, see Seiders, Inter-Agency Investiga-
tions of Marine Casualties Involving Public Vessels of the Navy, 30 JAG J. 87
(1978); Comment, Regulation of Maritime Safety: A Conflict of Standards, 4 MAR.
LAW. 89 (1979). The potential areas in which the Coast Guard and Public Health
Service interact are numerous. See, e.g., U.S. Public Health Service, Div. of Hos-
pitals and Clinics, Operations Manual, pt. B. ch. 1, § 2.4.2 (granting the Chief
Medical Officer, U.S. Coast Guard (a Public Health Service physician) "the final
decision as to fitness for sea duty"); 46 C.F.R. § 5.05-20 (a) (3) (1978) (mental in-
competency decisions); 46 U.S.C. § 239 (b) (2) (1976) (where proof of cure is an
issue in a narcotics revocation hearing); Matter of USMMD No. Z 607977-D7, 1969
A.M.C. 995, 999 (12th Coast Guard Dist. 1968) (alcoholism raised as a defense to a
misconduct charge). As the Comptroller General has properly urged, the medical
standards and procedures applied to merchant mariners by the Public Health
Service and the Coast Guard should be revised. This effort is apparently already
underway. See GAO Report, supra note 50, at 57-58.
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mariner be found not fit for sea duty,59 the members of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board, 60 and by the judges of federal- courts,61 to the ex-
tent that these latter two groups exercise review powers over decisions of
the Commandant.
While not involved formally in the course of an R.S. 4450 hearing, a
labor union will frequently be interested in the outcome, as will the
shipping company whose vessel figured in the charged misconduct or neg-
ligence. Victims of misconduct also tend to be interested in the results of
the proceedings, for obvious reasons. The hearing may have direct and in-
direct legal significance for future legal proceedings, 62 and can function as
a litigant's "dry run" in a case, or serve as a discovery tool for subsequent
litigation.
The rules by which the conduct of the participating officials will be
governed spring from varied sources. The Coast Guard in its capacity as
disciplinarian of merchant mariners will be guided by the applicable
statutory provisions and by regulations promulgated by the Commandant.
Among the statutes, the Administrative Procedure Act and the other
59. See Juan v. Grace Line, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); 42
C.F.R. §§ 32.6 (c) (6) (iii), 32.11-.23 (1978); 46 C.F.R. § 5.10-1 (b) (1979); Hendry v.
United States, 280 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
In medical cases, especially in circumstances where a seaman has voluntarily
deposited his document pending the issuance of a Fit for Sea Duty certificate by
the Public Health Service, see 46 C.F.R. § 5.05-15 (a) (1979), consideration should
be given to securing intra-agency review of adverse decisions of a Public Health
officer. However, counsel would be well advised not to attempt to obtain a fit-
ness for duty certificate through another marine hospital. This route, although
apparently successful in some cases, is not as desirable as an appeal to the director
of a Public Health Service marine hospital, corroborated by opinions of private
physicians. See Commandant v. Howell, 1 N.T.S.B. 2165 (1969) (counsel argued
that a good faith doubt existed as to the validity of the prior marine hospital's
decision); GAO Report, supra note 50, at 57 (seamen obtaining a favorable
decision from another marine hospital have apparently been successful in a few
cases).
60. See text accompanying notes 158-177 infra.
61. See text accompanying notes 178-250 infra. For another role of federaljudges in this area, see 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1976); 33 C.F.R. § 70.05-10 (1979) (where
a licensed officer is convicted of injuring or destroying an aid to navigation, li-
cense shall be revoked or suspended for a term to be fixed by the judge).
62. See, e.g., Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.).
cert. denied sub nom. Alvarez v. American Export Lines, Inc., 434 U.S. 954 (1978)
(testimony at R.S. 4450 hearing admissible in later civil action because Coast
Guard investigating officer was "predecessor in interest" to plaintiff; administra-
tive law judge's decision and order held admissible in civil litigation under FED.
R. EVID. 803 (8) (C)); Comment, Former Testimony-Coast Guard Hearing Officer
is Predecessor in Interest to Civil Litigant Under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(b)(1), 10 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 479 (1979); Note, "Evaluative Reports" and "Prede-
cessor in Interest" Construed to Admit Coast Guard Hearing Report and Testimony
Under Federal Rules of Evidence-Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 4 MAR.
LAw. 155 (1979). But see The Charles Morgan, 115 U.S. 69, 77 (1885).
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measures specifically relevant to the proceedings are paramount.0 3 At
times, other requirements of federal law will also govern the agency, and
in some instances state laws will be in issue, for example, where a docu-
ment, is revoked because of conviction of a state drug offense,6 4 or where
state pilotage questions arise.6 5 Issues of constitutional dimension have, of
course, also arisen.66
Rounding out the sources of law applicable in R.S. 4450 hearings are
judicial decisions (particularly the customary law developed in the ad-
miralty courts), prior appeal or review67 decisions of the Commandant 68
63. The Great Lakes Pilotage Act and § 239b (narcotics), which post-date the
APA, refer in haec verba to the APA. The Coast Guard indicated in 1967 in a note
to a proposed general revision of Title 46 that "the provisions of [46 U.S.C. §
239 (g)] . . . have been superseded" by the APA. U.S. Coast Guard, Supplement
to a Committee Print of a Draft Bill Entitled "The Marine Safety and Seamen's
Welfare Act of 1967," 90th Cong., Ist Sess., at 103 (Comm. Print 1967). Consistent
with this view, the more recent provision regarding tankerman endorsements
makes no such reference. Because § 239 (g) goes beyond procedural matters to the
extent that it sets forth criteria for revocation, the supersession is in any event
not complete. Indeed, it was this very section which triggered the applicability
of 5 U.S.C. § 554 (a) by creating a "case of adjudication required by statute to
be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." One lower
court has confirmed this by looking, in effect, to § 239 (g) rather than to the APA
to determine agency procedures. Miller v. Smith, 292 F. Supp. 55, 56 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). For a subsequent proposal to revise R.S. 4450, see note 258 infra. ,
64. E.g., Commandant v. Ogeron, No. ME-63 (N.T.S.B. Nov. 23, 1977). See
also 421 U.S. CoAS-r Guamm L. BULL. 2-3 (1979) (analyzing effect of state pardon).
65. E.g., Commandant v. Nelson, No. ME-60 (N.T.S.B. May 12, 1977).
66. See, e.g., Harris v. Smith, 1969 A.M.C. 1921 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 418 F.2d
899 (2d Cir. 1969) (right to counsel); Commandant v. Chapman, No. ME-50, slip
op. at.4-6 (N.T.S.B. Jan. 25, 1977) (right to counsel; self-incrimination). The Com-
mandant, however, has held he is without power to inquire into the constitu-
tionality of acts of Congress. Decision on Appeal No. 1786, 1 N.T.S.B. 2312, 2315-
16 (1970), modified on other grounds sub nom. Commandant v. Nickels, 1
N.T.S.B. 2309 (1972).
67. For the distinction between appeals to and reviews by the Commandant,
see text accompanying note 134 infra. The captions used in R.S. 4450 cases are un-
believably varied. Before the administrative law judge and Commandant, the
cases are styled "United States of America, United States Coast Guard v. License
No. 123456 and Merchant Mariners' Document Z-123456789-D3, issued to Richard
Roe, respondent." American Maritime Cases alter this to a "Matter of" format,
and the Commandant refers to his own prior decisions variously as "Appeal De-
cision No. 1234 (Roe)" or "Decision on Appeal No. 1234." The Safety Board
cites the Commandant's decision as "Appeal No. 1234 (Roe)." Before the Safety
Board, the caption on slip opinions becomes, e.g., "John B. Hayes, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard v. Richard Roe, appellant." Bound Safety Board decisions are
captioned simply "Richard Roe, appellant." The Board does not substitute names
when a new Commandant takes office, see, e.g., Commandant v. Christen, No.
ME-72, slip op. at 1 n.1 (N.T.S.B. Sept. 14, 1978), and cites its own opinions as
"Commandant v. Roe," although the Commandant's decisions cite the Board's
rulings as "Bender v. Roe." Some order should certainly be introduced into the
present chaos of case names. It is also not dear why Safety Board decisions show
one date as the date of issuance and another, often a week or more later, as the
date of service. Such practices can lead to confusion. See In re Consolidated Edison
Co., ALAB-414, 5 N.R.C. 1425, 1427-28 (1977).
68. These "Decisions on Appeal" are not yet systematically published, al-
though they are available from Coast Guard Headquarters, district offices, and
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and the National Transportation Safety Board,69 and internal agency
publications such as the Coast Guard Law Bulletin, Administratixie Law
Judges' Circulars,7 0 Administrative Law Judges' Internal Practices and
Procedures, volume V of the Marine Safety Manual of the Coast Guard,
chapter 71 of which deals with suspension and revocation proce'dures, 71
and internal regulations of the Public Health Service.72 It is io these
sources that the participants will look in preparing, trying, arguiing, and
deciding a merchant marine suspension or revocation case.
IV. HEARING PROCEDURES
A hearing under R.S. 4450 can arise in a variety of ways. The mariner
may, for example, have been given a diagnosis of "Not Fit for Duty" by
a physician of the United States Public Health Service. 73 He may have
been "logged" by the master of his vessel for some act of misconduct or
incompetence and the entry will be examined by the Coast Guard kt the
"payoff" that concludes a voyage. He may have been reported to at Coast
Guard Marine Inspection or Marine Safety Office by a victim or witness
to an act of misconduct or incompetence. Word may also reach the Coast
Guard through a United States consul 7 4 or an overseas Coast Guard
Marine Inspection and Safety Offices. An index is also available for cases de-
cided since the APA was fully applied to R.S. 4450 cases in 1948. See U.S. Coast
Guard, Index of Decisions of the Command in Suspension and Revocation Pro-
ceedings Under 46 C.F.R. 5 (Supp. 1977) (CG-440). Occasional rulings are re-
produced in American Maritime Cases, and where a case has been taken to the
National Transportation Safety Board, the Board appends both a summary of the
initial decision and the full text of the Commandant's ruling to its own decision.
69. Slip "Marine Decisions" of the Safety Board are available from the Board.
At this writing, two bound volumes of the Board's decisions in airmen's and
merchant marine safety enforcement cases have been issued by the Government
Printing Office. See also Hamilton, Administrative Practice in Aviation Medical
Proceedings, 26 EMORY L.J. 565, 586 n.118 (1977). Occasional Safety Board de-
cisions are reproduced in Pike & Fischer Administrative Law Service. E.g., McKee
v. Hawke, 1 N.T.S.B. 7, 22 Ad. L.2d 527 (1967).
70. See 46 C.F.R. § 1.20 (d) (1979).
71. 5 U.S. CoAsT GUARD, MARINE SAFETY MANUAL (Oct. 17, 1977) (CG495).
Under a questionable Freedom of Information Act ruling, the Marine Safety
Manual was for a time considered unavailable for public inspection.' See U.S.
Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction 5212.6 (June 26, 1969); 5 U.S.C.' § 552(1976). The current manual, however, is available and may be purchased from
the Government Printing Office. Supplemental information on agency, policies
may also be found in various "Instructions" and "Notices." See, e.g., U.S. Coast
Guard, Commandant Notice 5952 (Dec. 9, 1975), implementing Duarte v. United
States, 1976 A.M.C. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afrd, 532 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1976)."
72. See GAO Report, supra note 50, at 57 (noting reliance on P.H.S. Di-
vision of Hospitals and Clinics Operations Manual).
73. See U.S. Public Health Service, Div. of Hospitals and Clinics, Operations
Manual, pt. B. ch. 1, § 2.4.1; 5 U.S. CoAsr GUARD, MARINE SAFErY MANUAL art.
71-4-10A.
. 74. See 46 U.S.C. § 703 (1976), Vienna Conention on Consular Relations, art.
V, 1, entered into force Dec. 24, 1969, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261; 7 M. WHrrIEAN, DimGsT OF INT'L LAW 695-700 (1970). See generally Harris,
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Merchant Marine Detail75 of conduct or conditions which warrant an
investigation or hearing before an administrative law judge. Marine cas-
ualty investigations76 may and often do lead to suspension and revocation
proceedings 7
Not all misconduct will give rise to a Coast Guard investigation. The
point at which an activity constitutes an offense for which the merchant
mariner may be subjected to proceedings under R.S. 4450 may at times
be blurred; for our purposes it is enough to note that (with the exception
of narcotics cases and willful violations of provisions of Title 52 and regu-
lations thereunder) the mariner must have been acting under the authority
of his license or document. 78
When the report of an incident reaches the Marine Inspection or
Marine Safety Office, an investigation will be conducted by one of the
investigating officers to determine what official action, if any, is required.
Standards are not likely to vary substantially between investigating of-
ficers within a particular office, as any differences will probably be mini-
mized by the senior investigating officer. However, differing standards for
case selection between marine inspection zones may create some in-
equities. Forum-shopping sometimes occurs in instances where mariners
anticipate that an administrative law judge in one district will be more
lenient than in another.7 9 Generally, attempts at forum-shopping are made
under the guise of pleas of inconvenience to the seaman. As can be ex-
pected, individual officers are reluctant for this reason to agree to trans-
fer a case to another area. A change of venue also may make it more
difficult to try the case if a number of witnesses must be called. Because of
the necessarily itinerant nature of the merchant mariner's way of life, re-
quests for a change of venue call for a careful balancing of the need to
permit adequate time for each side to prepare its case and the need to mini-
mize inconvenience to shipping.
A particular investigating officer will evaluate some, but not all, of
the factors and alternatives generally associated with the exercise of ad-
ministrative prosecutorial discretion in determining whether a particular
aspect of misconduct warrants an R.S. 4450 heading. The investigating
officer will consider the actions complained of, the mariner's explanation
75. See 5 U.S. COAST GUARD, MARINE SAFETY MANUAL art. 71-3-40A.
76. See generally 46 C.F.R. pt. 4 (1979).
77. 46 C.F.R. §§ 4.09-35, 5.01-30 (a) (1979); 5 U.S. COAST GUARD, MARINE
SAFETY MANUAL art. 71-3-1.
78. Thus, action may not be taken against a license when the mariner's viola-
don of law arose from the fact that he owned the vessel, no personal license be-
ing required for mere vessel ownership. Commandant v. Soriano, No. ME-70, slip
op. at 8 (N.T.S.B. May 16, 1978). See also Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681(9th Cir. 1974) (no jurisdiction where pilot acted under state pilot license, even
though federal license was prerequisite for state license); Dietze v. Siler, 414 F.
Supp. 1105 (E.D. La. 1976).
79. See also GAO Report, supra note 50, at 17 (noting "relative autonomy of
districts and field units in carrying out their responsibilities, resulting in different
interpretations of marine safety requirements").
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(if one 1s requested and given),8 0 the vigor with which a master or vic-
tim demands that action be taken and, of course, the difficulty of proving
the case at a hearing. HOwever, factors such as the seaman's prior record
(known as a "MERMARPER") at Coast Guard Headquarters may no
longer be weighed at this time.
The alternatives open to the investigating officer are relatively few in
number: (1) close the case (e.g., where a complaint is frivolous, or un-
founded and motivated by personal animosity, or involves what is essentially
a labor-management dispute);sl (2) issue a warning to the mariner; (3) re-
quest a voluntary surrender of the mariner's document or license in prefer-
ence to facing a hearing; (4) institute a hearing by serving charges on the
seaman; 82 or (5) request that the matter be referred to the Department of
Justice or, in some cases, to local law enforcement authorities. It should
be clear that the mariner who has counsel at this early stage of the process
enjoys a considerable advantage over his less fortunate or less affluent
shipmates since counsel can at least attempt to persuade the investigating
officer to adopt a course short of a hearing.
The above discussion should not be understood as suggesting that
legally trained counsel invariably will be available to the mariner in R.S.
4450 cases. In fact, many cases are decided without legal representation of
the respondent.8 3 Sometimes this will be the result of a conscious choice
by the seaman, perhaps in anticipation of an order lenient enough to per-
mit him to continue to sail. At other times the lack of counsel may be due
to the confusion and ignorance of the seaman, while in some cases the ab-
sence of counsel will certainly be due to genuine indigency. Even with the
rising cost of legal services, most mariners earn enough to engage the
80. 46 C.F.R. § 5.05-10 (a) (1979) (requiring the officer to advise the seaman
of the complaint against him and to afford him the right to comment upon it).
Bup see Van Teslaar v. Bender, 365 F. Supp. 1007, 1010 (D. Md. 1973) (failure to
comply with this procedure will not vitiate a later hearing).
81. Compare 46 C.F.R. § 5.03-20 (1979) with In re George, 1955 A.M.C.
2064 (3d Coast Guard Dist. 1955) (R.S. 4450 case may be instituted for refusal
to obey an order relating to vessel safety even if labor disputes also involved).
82. Personal service of the charges may be deemed waived if the mariner
voluntarily absents himself, provided the hearing record includes evidence that
the respondent has actual notice he was about to be charged. The hearing may
then proceed in absentia. Commandant v. Sybiak, No. ME-64, slip op. at 4-6
(N.T.S.B. Feb. 17, 1978). Irregularities in service of the charges will also be deemed
waived if not pressed at the hearing and on intra-agency appeals. Christen v.
N.T.S.B., No. 78-3500, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. May 25, 1979) (per curiam).
83. The regulations under 46 U.S.C. § 239 (1976) construe the right to
counsel to include nonlawyers. 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-45 (a) (1) (1979). The author's
view is that-while nonlawyers may be helpful as expert consultants--"counsel"
means "lawyer." But see Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). This is the
position taken in the Great Lakes pilotage regulations, 46 C.F.R. § 401.615 (1978),
and seems to have been implicit in a decision holding that there is no right to
counsel when a mariner surrenders his license to avoid a hearing. Harris v. Smith,
1969 A.M.C. 1921 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 418 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1969). Pertinent Aus-
tralian regulations contemplate appearances pro se or "by barristers or solicitors."
See Australian Rule 44, at 853.
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services of an attorney, and thus would not qualify for legal aid even if it
were available for administrative hearings. However, the costs of legal
representation may exceed the means of many seamen if such representa-
tion includes not only the evidentiary hearing but also appeals to the
Commandant and National Transportation Safety Board, not to mention
judicial review.
It is fair to expect that there are some mariners who would qualify
for legal assistance if they were on trial in a criminal proceeding.8 4 For
these seamen one could suggest that the Coast Guard administrative law
judge should arrange for the assistance of counsel, as the Federal Trade
Commission urged in the American Chinchilla case.3 5 Despite the Govern-
ment's successful argument in Harris v. Smith8 6 that there is no right to
counsel in voluntary surrender cases and the district court's indication
in that case in dictum that there is no right to appointed counsel at dis-
ciplinary hearings,81 the Coast Guard nevertheless is "armed with all of
the panoply of legal machinery (funds, investigatory resources, staff of
skilled attorneys, etc.)." 88 Since R.S. 4450 hearings may have practical re-
sults as grave as FTC proceedings or criminal cases, similar principles
should govern, rather than a ritualistic application of the sixth amend-
ment's-requirement of a criminal prosecution as occurred in Harris. As
Commissioner Jones wrote for an unanimous Commission in the Chinchilla
case, "the Examiner or the respondent may obtain counsel on aid request of
either a local bar association or a local legal aid agency."8 9 Relying on
FTC v. Dean Foods Co.,90 Commissioner Jones suggested a petition by the
FTC complainant to a court of appeals for appointed counsel under the
All Writs Act.9 1
In a Coast Guard proceeding the administrative law judge could
84. See, e.g., Commandant v. Mills, 2 N.T.S.B. 2725, 2729 (1975) (noting
appearance of Legal Services Center attorney); Commandant v. Snider, 1 N.T.S.B.
2177, 2183 (1969) (noting appearance of Legal Aid Society attorney). At times a
legal aid society lawyer defending a client against a criminal narcotics charge may
accept the "pendent" proceeding initiated under § 239b.
85. F.T.C. Dkt. No. 8774, 26 Ad. L.2d 284 (1969).
86. 1969 A.M.C. 1921 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 418 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1969). In
Hasler v. United States, 1972 A.M.C. 2185 (N.D. Cal. 1971), the court found that a
mariner had been deprived of the statutory right to counsel where there was
evidence that he had surrendered his license based on misinformation from a
Coast Guard investigating officer. The surrender was held for this reason not to
have been voluntary. See also Duarte v. United States, 1976 A.M.C. 277 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), affd, 532 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1976).
87. Cf. McKee v. Hawke, 1 N.T.S.B. 7, 9, 22 Ad. L.2d 527, 530 (1967) ("The
government is under no duty to provide attorneys for respondents in [FAA]
safety enforcement proceedings.").
88. 26 Ad. L.2d at 284, 288.
89. Id. at 289 & n.11.
90. 384 U.S. 597, 603-05 (1966).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1691 (a) (1976). It is more likely that counsel could be ap-
pointed for an indigent mariner at the judicial review stage, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d)(1976), but even this is not free from doubt.
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instruct the investigating officer to petition for counsel, for the person
charged, from the court of appeals (from which judicial review would ul-
timately be available),92 but there seems to be no foundation for the ap-
pointment of counsel by that court while a case is still before the agency.
If appropriate guarantees of independence could be developed, it would
be preferable to detail a Coast Guard law specialist not regularly assigned
to Marine Inspection duties to act as counsel for the respondent,
93 just
as the service provides free legal counsel to its members who are tried by
court-martial for criminal offenses under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. 94 Even the provision of such counsel, of course, might be faulted
on the ground that the attorney had divided loyalties, and evidently it was
for this reason that the Coast Guard abandoned its previous practice of
giving free counsel to respondents. However, if the mariner were advised
of the potential conflict of interest and waived any objection on the record,
the result would seem clearly preferable to his being unrepresented by any
counsel, thereby having to rely on the administrative law judge for as-
sistance in the presentation of his case.
As has been indicated above in the preliminary discussion of the
dramatis personae, labor unions, shipowners, and others may have an
interest in the hearing. These groups may have interests that sharply con-
flict with those of the respondent mariner as well as the Coast Guard.
Without suggesting that they necessarily should play a more extensive
formal role in the hearings than merely observing and perhaps counseling
a respondent, and recognizing that there is no direct support in the regu-
lations for the notion, the question may be raised whether a more direct
role could be played by them: Could they become "parties"?
The Administrative Procedure Act provides the best guide to answer
this question. The APA covers both intervention before the agency and
92. See generally text accompanying notes 178-250 infra.
93. Although the provision of free counsel in agency cases has been a mat-
ter of active controversy in the past several years, and although Congress has
made express provision for it in limited cases, see, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
FTC Improvement Act, § 202, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (h) (1) (1976), the notion has not
received general acceptance. E.g., 4 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN S: J. GRUFF, ADMNISTrRA-
TrIVE LAW § 31.02 & n.16 (1977 & Supp. 1979). Nonetheless, there is precedent for
such counsel in the history of the marine inspection program itself. Both the Coast
Guard and the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation had policies to make
personnel available as defense counsel in R.S. 4450 cases, but this was apparently
done more often in practice by the Coast Guard than by the Bureau; manners
never requested defense counsel from the Bureau. See Conduct of Disciplinary
Hearings by Coast Guard Commissioned Officers: Hearings on H.R. 2966 and S.
1077 before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess., ser. no. 17, at 52, 99 (1948). For some years the regulations included
this provision: "Should the person charged desire counsel and has [sic] no means
of obtaining one, the examiner will secure an officer, if one is available, to act in
his defense." 46 C.F.R. § 137.09-5 (a), at 6325 (1947 Supp.). Compare Decision on
Appeal No. 776 (1954) with Decision on Appeal No. 1608 (1967). The practice
fell into desuetude and is no longer authorized by the regulations. See 46 C.F.R.
§ 5.20-45 (a) (1) (1979).
94. UCMJ art. 27 (b), 10 U.S.C. § 827 (b) (1976).
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entitlement to judicial review. Section 6 (a) of the Act states that "[s]o far
as the orderly conduct of public business permits, an interested person
may appear before an agency," 95 while section 10 (a) confers a right to ju-
dicial review upon any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute." 96 Additionally, the Independent Safety
Board Act of 1974 confers upon "any person disclosing a substantial in-
terest" the right to obtain review of orders of the Safety Board.
97
Are there any persons or groups whose interests warrant granting
them the status of parties? One point is dear: The provision in the regula-
tions which recites the interests vindicated by the proceedings is not in
itself a concession of standing. 98 A mere interloper, though a member of
the "general public" within the terms of the regulations, would not be a
proper party.99
Does a victim of misconduct have a strong enough interest? In general,
such a victim would not have a right to intervene, on the ground that
such a right would turn what is basically a public function of prosecution
into a forum for the vindication of private rights. However, there is ample
precedent for the interaction of public and private remedies in other
fields.100 Even if there were indications that allowing intervention by the
victim would contribute to the conduct of the hearing,'O' standing should
be denied. Victims of misconduct apparently could not maintain standing
on appeal to higher stages of the process even if they were allowed to in-
tervene in the initial R.S. 4450 hearing since their interest could not be
"distinguished from the public's interest in the administration of the
law."' 0 2 Granting victims of misconduct the status of a party to the hear-
ing, when they could not maintain standing at higher levels of review,
would have anomalous consequences.
On the other hand, in intricate cases arising out of collisions, where
the fact-finding process could be assisted by additional counsel and parties,
and where the uncharged master of "the other vessel" might seek to clear
his professional reputation, permission to intervene might properly be
95. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (b) (1976).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
97. 49 U.S.C. § 1903 (d) (1976).
98. 46 C.F.R. § 5.01-15 (1979). Indeed, another regulation, since revoked on
other grounds, had expressly stated that "[alppellants in [suspension and revoca-
tion] proceedings are the only persons considered to be directly concerned" and
hence entitled to free hearing records. 46 C.F.R. § 5.55-35 (a) (1978), deleted, 44
Fed. Reg. 5293 (1979).
99. See Joyce v. Bulger, 240 F. 817, 818 (W.D. Wash. 1916).
100. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
101. See Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies,
and Arbitrators, 81 HtAv. L. Ryv. 721, 765-66 (1967).
102. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940).
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granted at the hearing stage.103 The same result would be correct where,
as in Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 04 a person other than the
respondent later might be held to be the successor in interest to the in-
vestigating officer. Similarly, one can imagine a case where the seaman's
conduct complained of is inextricably intertwined with a collective bar-
gaining agreement-as where an order is not complied with because it con-
flicts with the terms of such an agreement. 05 In these circumstances it is
arguable that both the union and the shipowner or charterer should be
permitted to intervene or seek review.106 A shipowner's financial interest
may be linked sufficiently to that of the respondent under other circum--
stances as well, as where a penalty may be assessed against the vessel for
acts of the master.1 07
In view of such developments in the field of standing as Scenic Hud-
son Preservation Conference v. FPC,l08 and Office of CoM municat.on,100
still others may be entitled to participate in R.S. 4450 hearings. For ex-
ample, if a master were charged with abusing members of his crew for
racial or religious reasons,"10 groups active in the representation of mem-
bers of the relevant minorities Should be permitted either to int6rvene or
to assume a role of limited participation. Participation as amic, curiae
could also be permitted.
To date there has been a marked hostility toward all such interven-
kions. Recently, however, the Seafarers International Union instituted a
civil action against the Coast Guard in order to obtain rights' to 'intervene
in marine casualty investigations, which are closely related to disciplinary
proceedings, and at this writing has obtained temporary injunctive relief."'
On the other hand, the Safety Board, in what it described as a: ase of
first impression, reversed a decision of one of the administrative law
103. Note, however, that present suspension and revocation regulatid6s do
not permit counsel for a witness to participate in the hearing other than by ad-
vising his client as to his rights. 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-93 (a) (1979), cited in Note, 4
MAR. LAW. 155, 165 n.81 (1979).
104. 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Alvarez v. American Ex-
port Lines, Inc., 434 U.S. 954 (1978).
105. But see 24 Op. A-r'y GEN. 136, 137 (1902); Matter of George, 1955 A.M.C.
2064, 2076-77 (Sd Coast Guard Dist. 1955).
106. But see 46 C.F.R. § 5.03-20 (1979); Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
107. See Fredenberg v. Whitney, 240 F. 819 (W.D. Wash. 1917); Edw. 7, ch.
48, § 66; BRrrIsH RULEs 4-5, at 536; CANA lN RULE 7(1), at 430. In Australia,
"[alny person who satisfies the Court [of Marine Inquiry] that he has an interest
in the inquiry may appear, any other person may, by leave of the Court appear."
AUSTRALIAN RULE 7, at 848. Illustrating this broader Commonwealth approach, in
The Seistan, [1960] 1 All E.R. 32 (Adm. Div.), a ship's officer, not a party to the
investigation, was criticized by one of the assessors, see note 245 infra, and was
permitted to seek judicial review.
108. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
109. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
110. But see In re Niagara Mohawk Power Co., 3 A.E.C. 5, 10 (1965).
111. Seafarers Int'l Union v. Adams, Civ. No. 78-4698 (S.D.N.Y..Sept. 17,
1979) (granting temporary restraining order).
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judges granting to the Airline Passenger Association the right to in-
tervene in the DC4O investigation.112 That ruling plainly would appear
to be wrong in light of the terms of the statute governing parties to
Safety Board proceedings. Presumably, however, the Board's decision would
be similar in a suspension and revocation case, where, if anything, the
adversary quality of, the proceedings makes it less likely that third. party
groups could make a showing that their interests would be affected. Taken
together, the DC-4O and Seafarers cases should serve to clarify this long-
obscure area.
At the hearing, unless a plea of guilty is entered, 1 3 the investigating
officer will be required to prove the charge. The burden of proof is, of
course, not as difficult to satisfy as in a criminal prosecution; all that is
necessary is substantial, reliable and probative evidence."14 While there is
authority that the strict rules of evidence do not apply to the proceed-
ings,115 administrative law judges occasionally hold the Coast Guard to
the rules of evidence applied in the district courts, and the suggestion
has been made :that the Federal Rules of Evidence be made applicable to
R.S. 4450 hearings."16 Even though the admission of hearsay evidence is
nominally permitted, some administrative law judges may be disinclined
to find a charge "proved" unless there is substantial, reliable, and probative
nonhearsay evidence to support the finding. In fact, the Marine Safety
Manual takes the view that valid findings "cannot be based upon hearsay
alone, nor upon hearsay corroborated by a mere scintilla" of nonhearsay
evidence.117 While circumstantial evidence is allowed, it has been held
that the doctrine of res'ipsa loquitur may not be applied in R.S. 4450 pro-
ceedings."18
Log entries play an important role in many R.S. 4450 proceedings.
Entries made by a vessel's master in substantial compliance with the federal
logbook statute"19 are considered prima facie evidence of. the facts so
112. Bond v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., Order No. EA-1305 (N.T.S.B. July 9,
1979).
113. Pleas of nolo contendere were disallowed by Decision on Appeal No.
1925 (1973) (Abbott). Despite the terms of 46 C.F.R. § 5.03-1 (a) (1979), such a
plea was accepted in one recent hearing. See Note, 4 MAR. LAW. 155,- 164 n.86
(1979) (discussing No. 16722/828 (Ellison) (8th Coast Guard Dist. Oct. 23,
1978)). The Ellison case is currently pending review at Coast Guard Headquar-
ters.
114. 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-95 (b) (1979).
115. Id. § 5.20-95 (a).
116. See Note, 4 MAR. LAW. 155, 158 n.35 (1979). The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence do not apply ex. proprio vigore to R.S. 4450 hearings, FED. R. Evm. 101,
1101, but -it is obvio.us that they "have a bearing" on agency proceedings. See 4
B. MEzNEs, J. STEIN & J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 22.04 (1979).
117. 5 U.S. COAST GUARD, MARINE SAFETY MANUAL art. 71-7-45D, citing- Wil-
lapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 690 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358U.S.
860 (1949). -
118. 417 U.S. CoAsT GuARw L. BULL. 23 (1979).
119. 46 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
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recorded.12 0 Conversely, the fact that no log entry has been made where
one might have been made has been held to be irrelevant to a finding of
guilty.1 21 In order to comply with the statute, the log entry must be made
in a timely fashion and read to the mariner. The mariner must then be
given an opportunity to comment; this comment must also be recorded
in the logbook. A log entry made in this fashion will shift the burden- of
going forward with the evidence to the respondent.122 Even if not made
in substantial compliance with the law, the Safety Board has ruled, a log
entry is admissible as a business record, though it will be afforded little
probative value. 123
One thoughtful commentator on procedures in airmen's cases, which
in some respects parallel those applicable to marine cases, has suggested
that practitioners "make peace with the relaxed rules of evidence in the
administrative setting and, rather than impeding the proceedings by re-
peatedly raising futile hearsay objections, plan to use these ground rules
to his client's best advantage."' 2 4 This advice is sound, but it should not
deter counsel in R.S. 4450 cases from insisting that the statutory require-
ments for log entries be scrupulously observed as a precondition to their
admission into evidence.
After the evidence has been heard, the administrative law judge will
render a decision and order. Since the administrative procedure reflects
the possibility of adverse consequences for the person charged, the Table
of Average Orders12 5 merits discussion. On its face this chart, published
as part of the Coast Guard's R.S. 4450 regulations, purports to approximate
the severity of the order a mariner may expect upon proof of a particular
charge. The Table is advisory only, and indicates neither maxima or
minima for disciplinary actions. Indeed, the explanatory notes seem to
authorize departures from it whenever convenient. 126
The difficulty is that the Table is included in the Code of Federal
Regulations, thereby suggesting that it has considerable if not binding
weight in hearings.127 Furthermore, the Table is misleading because it
120. 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-107 (b) (1979).
121. Decision on Appeal No. 1987 (Brown), 2 N.T.S.B. 2698, 2700 (1973),
aff'd, 2 N.T.S.B. 2696 (1974).
122. Commandant v. Burke, 2 N.T.S.B. 2784, 2786 n.6 (1976), citing 28 U.S.C.§ 1732 (1976); Commandant v. Reed, No. ME-60, slip op. at 6 & n.7 (N.T.S.B.
July 29, 1977), quoting In re Keller, 273 F. Supp. 945, 947 (E.D. Va. 1967).
123. Commandant v. Christen, No. ME-72, slip op. at 7 (N.T.S.B. Sept. 14,
1978), quoting United States v. Strassman, 241 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1959).
124. Hamilton, Administrative Practice in Aviation Medical Proceedings, 26
EMoRY L.J. 565, 588 (1977).
125. 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-165 (1979); Decision on Appeal No. 1711 (1968).
126. 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-165 (a) (1979).
127. See, e.g., Commandant v. Reed, No. ME-60, slip op. at 8 (N.T.S.B. July
29, 1977) ("The case before us neither requires nor supports any deviation from
the scale of average orders in Coast Guard regulations.").
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does not reflect a current average of actual orders.' 28 These shortcomings
could be corrected by a study of the severity of recent decisions and orders
and a recomputation from the data obtained. Alternatively, the wisdom of
including such a table in the Code of Federal Regulations could be ques-
tioned. In regard to the severity, one commentator has suggested that fu-
ture versions of the Table of Average Orders place greater emphasis on the
administrative law judge's power to reduce an officer's rating, 29 reserving
more severe orders to cases of "delinquencies in navigation and seaman-
ship."'130 Until some reform is undertaken along these or similar lines, the
mariner and his counsel will be forced to rely on whatever intelligence may
be gleaned locally concerning "sentencing" patterns in the port in which
the hearing is to be conducted.
V. APPELLATE POWERS OF THE COMMANDANT
Once the administrative law judge has rendered a decision and order
and it is served on the respondent,' 3 ' barring a petition to reopen the hear-
ing "on the basis of newly-discovered evidence, 132 the seaman may seek re-
lief by appealing an adverse decision to the Commandant of the Coast
Guard.133 Provision is also made for sua sponte review on the Com-
mandant's own motion in cases not appealed. 34 The regulations in this
area are straightforward, but a few matters require special mention.
First, time is of the essence in securing appellate review within the
agency; there is a thirty-day limit for filing the notice of appeal, and a
sixty-day limit for noting the grounds relied on.' s 5 Under the exhaustion
doctrine, failure to comply with these rules will bar judicial review as
128. Ironically, the Coast Guard has recently found that certain statistics it
has used for the rating of its own personnel were not accurate, despite the fact
that they purported to represent an "experienced distribution" of marks on of-
ficers' fitness reports. See, e.g., In re McFarland, No. 91-77 (Coast Guard Board for
Correction of Military Records Sept. 18, 1978); Hunter, Officer Fitness Reports-
Let's Scrap Numerical Grades, U.S.C.G. ACAD. ALUMNI BULL., at 32 (Jan.-Feb.
1979). Stale information can work a substantial unfairness in such situations. The
Coast Guard has, it may be added, resisted the attempt to compare the procedures
for discipline within the service with those applicable in R.S. 4450 cases. See
Decision on Appeal No. 1786, 1 N.T.S.B. 2312, 2315-16 (1970), modified on other
grounds sub nom. Commandant v. Nickels, 1 N.T.S.B. 2309 (1972).
129. See 46 U.S.C. § 229 (1976); 46 C.F.R. § 5.20-170 (d) (1979).
130. Viewpoint, 16 THE CoMPASS 30 (1969).
131. See note 82 supra.
132. 46 C.F.R. § 5.25 (1979).
133. Id. § 5.30-1 (a). The Commandant has delegated his authority to rule on
appeals from non-revocation proceedings to the Vice-Commandant. See id. §§
1.10 (b), 5.01-1 (d), 5.02-1.
134. Compare 46 C.F.R. § 5.30 (1979) with id. § 5.35. By the end of 1979, the
Commandant had issued decisions in over 2166 appealed cases, as well as 12 "re-
views" on his own motion. Decision on Review No. 12 (1979) (Conley) was the
first such action in nearly a decade. 36 MARINE SAFETY COUNCIL PROC. 43 (1979).
135. 46 C.F.R. § 5.30-3 (1979).
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effectively aS would a total failure to seek relief from the Commandant. 8 6
These limits run from the effective date of the order, which usually will
be the time of its delivery to the respondent. 13 7 However, the sixty-day
period for noting the grounds for the appeal runs from the receipt 'by the
respondent of a copy of the transcript, if it has been requested.148 The
transcript, which is free,13 9 must be requested simultaneously with the
filing of the notice of appeal.140 An appeal, however, may be taken without
a transcript. 14'
Secondly, the scope of appellate review at this stage is quite broad,
extending to any matters excepted to by the seaman, the sufficiency of
the evidence, clear errors in the record, and matters going to jurisdiction.1 42
Further, the Commandant retains plenary power to "affirm, reverse;- alter,
or modify . . or ... remand" the initial decision.143 This could be read
to mean that he may increase the severity of the order as well as decrease
it, but the Commandant's Decisions on Appeal refute the notion,. 44 and
the regulation concerning sua sponte review expressly bars such .action.1 4 5
Hence,. this possibility has not served and should not serve to..deter re-
spondents from seeking relief from the Commandant. Particularly where a
respondent has raised issues of a constitutional dimension, the administra-
tive law judge's order should not be made harsher on appeal .sinq. this
would place a burden on the privilege of raising constitutional questions. 148
Thirdly, provision has been made for stays' 47 as well as for ,the is-
suance of temporary seaman's documents pending decision on the.appeal. 48
136. Bradshaw v. Siler, 1976 A.M.C. 1924 (E.D. Va. 1975) (sustaining .Com-
mandant's refusal to entertain untimely appeal); Jennings v. Smith, 280 F. Supp.
1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same). See also Cabales v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1323
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1969). If an appeal is not timely
filed, the administrative law judge's decision "is final and binding on the person
charged as of the date that the decision is delivered to the person charged-or his
authorized representatives." 46 C.F.R. § 1.25 (b) (1979).
137. Compare 46 C.F.R. §§ 5.20-175 (a)-(c) (1979) with id. § 5.30-170 (f).
138. 46 C.F.R. § 5.30-3 (a) (1979).
139. United States v. Fuller, 330 F. Supp. 303, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (unsuc-
cessful action by government to recover transcript cost from attorney for R.S. 4450
respondent).
140. 46 C.F.R. § 5.30-1 (c) (1979).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 5.30-1 (f).
143. Id. § 5.30-10.
144. See Decision on Appeal No. 570 (1952) (Casper); Decision on Appeal
No. 1750 (1969).
145. 46 C.F.R. § 5.35-15 (a) (1979).
146. See also North Carolina v. Pierce, 395 U.S. 711, 744 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting), 726 (Douglas, J., concurring), noted in The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 187-92 (1969); United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968), noted in The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82, HARr. L; REv.
63, 156 (1968).,
147. 46 C.F.R. § 5.30-35 (c) (1979).
148. 46 C.F.R. § 5.30-15 (1979). Denial of a request for a temporary document
must be appealed to the Commandant within 10 days of the administtative law
judge's decision. Id. § 5.30-15 (a) (I).
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The latter could be critical to a seaman who is without skills salable on
shore. In many instances, of course, it may take as long to secure a decision
on the temporary document application as it would to determine finally
the pending appeal. Also of importance are the provisions for the exercise
of clemency by the Commandant following a revocation or surrender of
documents, 149 although it would be a mistake to consider this an effective
way to reopen-collaterally a suspension or revocation decision.150
Finally, while a decision of the Commandant will be signed by him,
it will have been formulated within the Office of the Chief Counsel. at
Coast Guard Headquarters. For a time, there was also a Permanent Board
to Hear Oral Argument.' 5 ' Although oral argument could be made before
this Board, it was. not encouraged. Any memorandum the members pre-
pared, and which might have found its way to the Commandant, was not
subject to examination at the judicial review stage.' 52 More recently, how-
ever, the Permanent Board has fallen into disuse; no appeals have been
heard in this fashion for over twenty years.
A reading of the regulations alone might lead one to believe that the
only way a case could be examined by the Commandant would be if the
administrative law judge had found the charges proved. There is no pro-
vision for appeals by the investigating officer who prosecuted the case.
However; an examination of the Administrative Procedure Act leads. to 'the
alarming conclusion that even a finding of not guilty may be appealable
within the agency at the instance of a party other than the respondent. 53
Even- without a regulation specifically authorizing such appeals, -once. an
interested person had ,been permitted to intervene at the hearing stage,
he would be entitled under the APA to vindicate his interest at the Com-
mandant level. 154 Could such a person claim reliance on the prosecutorial
efforts of the Marine Inspection Office? 55 The possibility of an appeal by
a party other than the respondent in not guilty cases would be consigtent
with a remedial theory underlying the proceedings; but if the proceedings
i49. 46 C.F.R. § 5.13-1 (1979).
150. See, e.g., Word v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Ala. 1963);
Cruz v. Siler, Civ. No. 76-5348 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1978).
151. See generally Miller v. Smith, 292 F. Supp. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
160 U.S. CoAsr GUARD L. BULL. 12 (1949); 163 U.S. CoAST GUARD L. BULL. 6(.1949); 167 U.S. CoAsr GUARD L. BULL. 9 (1950).
• 152. On the other hand, in Cruz v. Siler, Civ. No. 76-5348 (S.D.N.Y. June 23,
1978), the district court had before it-and relied on-the report of the Clemency
Board, as this was plainly part of the agency record.
153. 5 U.S.C. §.555 (b) (1976).
154. See text accompanying notes 95-107 supra.
155- But see Lloyd v. American Export Lines, Inc., 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.),
cort. denied sub nom. Alvarez v. American Export Lines, Inc., 434 U.S. 954 (1978);
Spanish Int'l Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 385 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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seem to have a penal flavor,15 6 then such a right could not be supported
under current standards.1
57
VI. APPELLATE REVIEW BY THE
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
If the order of the administrative law judge has been less drastic than
revocation or suspension of a license or document (i.e., if it has merely
been an "admonition"), or if it has been so modified by the Commandant,
the mariner may seek direct judicial review of the decision. 158 However,
where a license or document has been revoked, suspended, denied, 59 or
where the mariner is placed on probationary suspension, 6 0 further ad-
ministrative review in the form of an appeal to the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board is required under the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies.' 6 '
Review by the Safety Board is not only a legal prerequisite to judicial
review; 162 it is desirable because of the Board's independence from the
Coast Guard. The Safety Board consists of five members appointed by the
156. Compare Fredenberg v. Whitney, 240 F. 819 (W.D. Wash. 1917) and
Bulger v. Benson, 262 F. 929 (9th Cir. 1920), afrg 251 F. 757 (W.D. Wash. 1918)
with 24 Or. AT'ry GN. 186 (1902).
157. 46 C.F.R. §§ 1.20 (b), 5.35-1 (a) (1979). For an example of an abortive
attempt by a supervising inspector of the Coast Guard's predecessor agency to
take such action, see Aiwen v. Fisher, 279 F. 164 (W.D. Wash. 1922), affd, 290
F. 8 (9th Cir. 1923).
158. See Cabales v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd,
412 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1969).
159. In license denial cases, there will not have been an APA hearing before
an administrative law judge. Rather, the appeal will have been taken through
the Coast Guard chain of command from the OCMI to the Commandant or his
delegate. See 46 C.F.R. §§ 1.20 (b), 10.02-33, 10.13-33, 12.02-25 (1979). See also 46
C.F.R. § 10.25-7 (e) (2) (1979) (Commandant review of rejection of application for
staff officer registration). Such appeals must be taken within 30 days 'of the de-
cision appealed from. In the case of appeals from a denial of a request for a
temporary license or document, however, the request, which evidently goes
directly from the administrative law judge to Headquarters, must be filed within
10 days. 46 C.F.R. § 5.30-15 (a) (1) (1979). For regulations governing appeals from
decisions regarding vessel inspections, see 46 C.F.R. § 2.01-70 (1979).
160. Commandant v. Leskinen, No. ME-57 (N.T.S.B. May 9, 1977) (dismiss-
ing appeal for want of jurisdiction).
161. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1903 (a) (9) (1976); 49 C.F.R. pt. 825 (1978);
46 C.F.R. § 5.30-30 (1979).
162. Desvaux v. Siler, 1976 A.M.C. 2352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But see Commandant
v. Christen, No. ME-72, slip op. at 3 & n.6 (N.T.S.B. Sept. 14, 1978) (noting civil
action in M.D. La. brought by respondent against Coast Guard in which Safety
Board was neither party nor privy). The district court's assertion of jurisdiction
in Christen after the Safety Board had ruled was plainly wrong in light of the
exhaustion doctrine and the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the courts of ap-
peals. Christen's case was ultimately taken to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the
Safety Board in an unpublished per curiam decision. Christen v. N.T.S.B., No.
78-3500 (5th Cir. May 25, 1979).
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President with senatorial confirmation,163 and, although part of the De-
partment of Transportation from 1967 to 1975, it now operates under a
clear statutory mandate of independence from that Department and its
subagencies.' 64 At this stage the Coast Guard, in the person of the Com-
mandant, becomes a party to an adversary proceeding which may (at the
Safety Board's discretion)165 include oral argument. The Chief Counsel's
Office represents the Commandant before the Safety Board. 66
Although the Safety Board's regulations for seaman appeals are merci-
fully brief, a few aspects should be mentioned. The regulations establish
a very short ten-day period from the date of receipt of the Commandant's
decision in which to file a notice of appeal, and a twenty-day period there-
after for filing supporting briefs and memoranda and requesting oral
argument.' 67 Significantly, while the grounds for Safety Board review ap-
pear to be of a broader and perhaps more policy-oriented nature than
those for Commandant appeals and reviews,' 68 the alternatives open to
the Safety Board are narrower than those of the Commandant.' 69 The
broad power of the Commandant to review an order and amend its terms
is supplanted by a power to affirm or reverse, remand or dismiss. This dif-
ference creates an ambiguity as to the role of the Safety Board. Its powers on
review make it more like an appellate court than a higher level in a regula-
tory agency, and yet the Safety Board may correct an "erroneous" finding
of fact170-a power the Commandant possesses only as to matters excepted
to at the initial hearing or "clear errors in the record.""", The latter power
is exercised sparingly.
The Safety Board has taken the view that it is powerless to consider
the reasonableness or constitutionality of regulations of the agencies it
oversees. 172 Unlike the Commandant, the Safety Board cannot grant interim
163. 49 U.S.C. § 1902 (1976). Despite its multi-member composition, the
Safety Board's decisions are nearly always unanimous. Separate opinions and dis-
sents are extremely rare. See, e.g., Commandant v. Neilson, 2 N.T.S.B. 2684, 2687
(1974) (Thayer, dissenting); Commandant v. Neves, 2 N.T.S.B. 2775, 2777 (1976)
(Thayer, dissenting). The dissenting opinion is an equally rara avis in airmen s
cases before the Safety Board. See, e.g., Administrator v. Pirkey, 2 N.T.S.B. 2272,
2276 (1976) (Bailey, dissenting); Administrator v. Wilson, 2 N.T.S.B. 2454, 2456
(1976) (Bailey, dissenting); Administrator v. Cooper, 1 N.T.S.B. 1315, 1319 (1971)
(McAdams & Burgess, dissenting).
164. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1901 (2), 1902 (a) (1976).
165. 49 C.F.R. § 825.25 (1978). See, e.g., Commandant v. Kuntz, 1 N.T.S.B.
2158, 2161 (1969).
166. 46 C.F.R. §§ 5.30-30 (b)- (c) (1979).
167. 49 C.F.R. §§ 825.5, .20 (1978). On the requirement for filing a brief in
order to perfect an appeal, see Commandant v. Peters, 1 N.T.S.B. 2152 (1968).
168. Compare 49 C.F.R. § 825.15 (1978) with 46 C.F.R. §§ 5.30-1 (f), 5.35-10
(1979).
169. Compare 49 C.F.R. § 825.30 (1978) with 46 C.F.R. § 5.30-10 (1979).
170. 49 C.F.R. § 825.15 (a) (1978).
171. 46 C.F.R. §§ 5.301-1 (f) (1)- (2)(1979).
172. Graham v. N.T.S.B., 530 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1976).
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relief in the form of an extension of a temporary document.' 73 While fil-
ing an appeal with the Commandant or the Safety Board does not auto:
matically stay the decision below, such stays may be granted when a case
has been appealed to the Board. 174
Having come into existence on April 1, 1967, the Safety Board's part
in the regulatory process is becoming fairly well-defined, although the
process has been slow. As of January 1, 1979, the Safety Board had issued
only seventy-two marine decisions. This is a much smaller caseload than
the Board has with respect to airman licenses. 175 There is still almost no
body of judicial review case law dealing with Safety Board marine de-
cisions,170 although decisions of the Commandant had from time to time
been the subject of judicial review.177 Since review is available in the
courts, it is to them that the inquiry now turns.
VII. JUDICIAL REvIEW
Considering the fact that the federal government has been granting
and revoking mariners' documents of one sort or another for well over a
century, it is surprising that so few revocation or suspension decisions have
come before the courts on direct review. A number of cases have involved
collateral attacks on R.S. 4450 proceedings. These cases will be considered
first.
Perhaps the most frequent form of collateral attack has been the so-
called "turnover" proceedings. These are statutory actions by seamen who
have been logged for desertion and wish to reclaim their wages and ef-
fects from the custody of a district court.1 78 The usual course is for the
petitioning seaman to question the efficacy of the master's log entry,1 9
perhaps demonstrating that the desertion logging has not been sustained
in a Coast Guard hearing. For example, in Petition of Sanuiti,18 0 the dis-
trict judge noted that "[a]ttached to the petition was a typewritten copy
of finding by the United States Coast Guard Examiner . . . to the effect
that the petitioner was not in fact a deserter, but that he violated cer-
173. Compare note 148 supra with Commandant v. Pompey, 1 N.T.S.B. 2176
n.4 (1969). See also Commandant v. Kuntz, 1 N.T.S.B. 2158, 2161 n.7 (1969).
174. See 46 C.F.R. § 5.30-35 (c) (1979); 5 U.S. CoAsT GUARD, MAhINE SAFETY
MANUAL art. 72-9-25B. See, e.g., Commandant v. Ernser, No. ME-67, slip op. at
4 n.5 (N.T.S.B. Dec. 1, 1978); Commandant v. Neves, 2 N.T.S.B. 2775 & n.4 (1976).
175. Coast Guard cases account for only a small part of the Safety Board's
appellate business. For example, in 1976 the Safety Board decided 130 appeals
by airmen but only 6 marine cases. 1976 N.T.S.B. Ann. Rep. 45 (1977).
176. At this writing there are no published opinions of the courts of appeals in
marine cases, and only one unpublished opinion, Christen v. N.T.S.B., No. 78-3500
(5th Cir. May 25, 1979). The Safety Board's Annual Reports to Congress for the
years 1972-76 refer to only two judicial review actions in marine cases, both in
district court.
177. See generally text accompanying notes 178-196 infra.
178. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 701, 705-706 (1976).
179. See 46 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
180. 124 F. Supp. 69 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
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tain. regulations relative to his failure to report to the ship, of which he
was a crew member."18 1 The court went on to observe that "[t]he finding
of the Coast Guard Examiner, unauthenticated in any manner, is not
binding upon this court on the question of desertion."' 82
From the decision one would have assumed that Sanuiti might be
limited to its facts due to the informal way in which the court had been
apprised of the Coast Guard decision. But it has been cited and relied
on in later "turnover" cases as support for a more broad-ranging rejection
of findings in R.S. 4450 cases. In Larson v. United States,8 3 a seaman at-
tempted to vacate a statutory forfeiture ordered for desertion, arguing that
the Coast Guard had found him guilty of a "failure to join" and not
guilty of desertion, thereby attempting to use the hearing examiner's de-
cision as a shield. The claimant was allowed to recover his personal effects
but not his wages. The district court commented, "The Examiner obviously
misinterpreted the log.... In any event, the findings by a Coast Guard
Examiner with respect to desertion are not binding upon the court."'18 4
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit stated, "The District Court, as we think
rightly, attributed little weight to the examiner's findings in view of the
fact that they were based on the statement of the appellant alone."' 8
The "turnover" cases may be viewed as a variety of collateral review
of Coast Guard decisions in which the agency decisions have been ac-
corded little or no weight.'8 6 This raises the question whether the same
underlying conduct should result in divergent consequences in actions by
agencies of the same government theoretically applying separate parts of a
single rational regulatory program. As will be seen shortly, there is a
marked contrast between the weight given R.S. 4450 decisions in collateral
areas such as "turnover" proceedings and those on direct judicial review.' 87
181. Id. at 70.
182. Id.
183. 152 F. Supp. 252, 254 (E.D. Va. 1957), afrd, 255 F.2d 166, 169 (4th Cir.
1958), noted in 1 P. EDELMAN, MARnTME INJURY AND DEATH 52 n.21 (1960).
184. 152 F. Supp. at 254 (citing Sanuiti).
185. 255 F.2d at 169. See also Petition of Tomkins, 1967 A.M.C. 1133 (S.D.
Tex. 1965) (seaman unable to show captain had logged him improperly); Kellar
v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 945, 951 (E.D. Va. 1967) (court ignored a letter
from the Coast Guard advising it that an administrative hearing found desertion
not proved).
186. In contrast, judicial decisions in "turnover" proceedings have been cited
and relied on by the Safety Board, the Commandant, and Coast Guard administra-
tive law judges as authoritative in the desertion area. Commandant v. Kuntz, 1
N.T.S.B. 2158, 2160 (1969), citing In re Scott, 143 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Cal. 1956);
Decision on Appeal No. 1075 (1958); In re USMMD No. Z607977-D7, 1969 A.M.C.
995, 1001-03 (12th Coast Guard Dist. 1968).
187. Had the plaintiff in Cabales v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd, 412 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1969), refrained from commencing his action
until the hearing and review process had concluded, this divergence would have
been squarely presented, since his action presumably would then have included
both an attack on the forfeiture of his wages and effects and a request for judicial
review of the agency decision.
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In Juan v. Grace Line, Inc., 8 8 the Coast Guard process was not itself
the subject of a cause of action, but rather was raised in defense by a ship-
owner in a Jones Act case. The seaman had voluntarily deposited his docu-
ment with the Coast Guard pending the issuance of a Fit for Duty slip
from the Public Health Service.1 8 9 The examining physician described the
man as permanently not fit for duty and the mariner commenced an action
to recover for the injuries leading to his incapacitation. The court held
that the jury's verdict in favor of the seaman was excessive and ordered
a partial new trial on damages, and found that no regulation authorized the
Public Health Service to render a permanent Not Fit for Duty finding.190
As the opinion properly points out, the voluntary deposit of a document
is to be distinguished from a revocation on grounds of physical or mental
incompetence.' 9 ' Nevertheless, the case suggests yet another context in
which collateral review might be available from the courts.
The final variety of collateral attack which may be available in R.S.
4450 cases is closely related to the direct judicial review. This method is
seen in Cabales v. United States,9 2 which involved a log entry for deser-
tion, and, like Juan, illustrates how judicial review of a disciplinary de-
cision may be intertwined with the vindication of other rights of the
seaman. In Cabales a prayer for an injunction against a pending Coast
Guard hearing was joined with claims against the United States as ship-
owner, the master, and the general agent for the ship, to recover wages
and personal effects as well as statutory penalties for nonpaymeiht of
wages.'9 3 Although distinct yet related causes of action were raised in the
single suit by the seaman, the court decided each on separate grounds, re-
jecting the request for an injunction because of a failure to exhaust avail-
able administrative remedies.
Hendry v. United States'0 4 also illustrates how questions relating to
R.S. 4450 hearings may be raised collaterally in another related cause of
action. Hendry sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence
and malpractice arising out of a Public Health Service finding'that he
was physically not fit for duty as a merchant marine deck officer. As in
Juan, the Coast Guard refused, after a voluntary deposit, to return the
plaintiff's papers when the doctors found him unfit for sea duty. The
district court found no evidence of the negligence, malpractice, or emo-
tional injuries alleged, and, significantly, held the medical evaluations of
188. 299 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
189. See 46 C.F.R. § 5.05-15 (4) (1979).
190. 299 F. Supp. at 1263. See also U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, Div. OF
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS, OPERATIONS MANUAL, pt. B, ch. 1, § 2.4. But see Com-
mandant v. Owens, 1 N.T.S.B. 2186, 2188 (1969).
191. 299 F. Supp. at 1263. See also Hendry v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 27(S.D.N.Y. 1968), afrd, 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
192. 300 F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff"d, 412 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1969).
193. 46 U.S.C. §§ 596-597 (1976).
194. 280 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
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seamen by the Public Health Service at the request of the Coast Guard to
be discretionary acts not within the ambit of the Tort Claims Act.195
(If the lower court in Hendry was correct, then Coast Guard proceedings
would be discretionary for FTCA purposes, but nondiscretionary for pur-
poses of judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.) On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit agreed that there was no evidence of negligence,
but held the "discretionary function" exception inapplicable after ex-
.amining the agency action involved and finding it not of a policy-making
nature.196 As a result, the Hendry route may be a promising one if negli-
gence can be proven. Rewards could be great in the case of success since
money damages could be awarded as well as the reinstatement of the
mariner's document or license.
Thus far the discussion has focused on collateral remedies for sea-
men involved in R.S. 4450 proceedings. Turning to direct judicial review
of such cases, the final agency decision, as has been indicated, may rest
with either the Commandant or the National Transportation Safety Board,
depending upon whether the order is one that may be appealed to the
Safety Board. If the Commandant is the final arbiter, review is available
in district court.191 Where a Safety Board decision is on review, jurisdic-
tion lies in the courts of appeals.' 9 8 District court review will also be
available regarding Commandant decisions denying clemency or refusals
195. 280 F. Supp. at 31-33. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976); Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed To Agency Discretion,"
82 HARv. L. REv. 367 (1968) (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1976)). See also
Gariepy v. The King, [1939] Ex. C.R. 321, [1940] 2 D.L.R. 12 (1939).
196. 418 F.2d at 779-84. Under Judge Waterman's analysis, if a particular de-
licensing or refusal to return a surrendered document attacked in a Federal Tort
Claims Act action were found to be an exercise of discretion-one indication of
which would be the relative rank of the officials involved-the district court would
lack jurisdiction. The opinion thus encourages appellants to couch their complaints
on a factual as opposed to a policy basis, and forecloses the FTCA suit as a means
of collateral review of a regulation.
197. Under the Safety Board's original judicial review provision, its decisions
were to be reviewed "to the same extent and in the same manner as if such orders
and actions had been by the department or agency exercising such functions,
powers, and duties immediately preceding their transfer" to the Board. 49 U.S.C.
§ 1653 (c) (1970). Thus, while aviation certificate cases were reviewable in the
courts of appeals, merchant marine cases would be heard in a district court. E.g.,
Keating v. United States, Civ. No. 74-262 (E.D. La. Apr. 14, 1975), dismissing ap-
peal from Commandant v. Keating, 2 N.T.S.B. 2654 (1973). The Independent
Safety Board Act of 1974 corrected this anomaly by making the Safety Board's
marine decisions reviewable in the courts of appeals, but left the situation with
respect to judicial review of any Commandant's Decisions on Appeal that are not
reviewable by the Board as it had always been. The suggestion in 1 M. NoRms,
TiH LAw OF SEAMEN § 87 (3d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1978), that the district courts have
no role at all in direct review of R.S. 4450 cases, therefore, is incorrect. Dietze v.
Siler, 414 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. La. 1976), went directly from the Commandant to
district court because the Safety Board had redelegated its jurisdiction in suspen-
sion cases to the Commandant. Under current procedures, the case would have
gone from the Commandant to the Board and then on to a court of appeals.
198. 49 U.S.C. § 1903 (d) (1976).
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to return documents which have been voluntarily surrendered in order
to avoid a hearing.' 99
The courts are loath to interfere with administrative processes prior
to entry of a final order of the agency. Under the exhaustion doctrine,200
interlocutory relief has been denied with respect to a pending R.S. 4450
hearing despite the mariner's claim that he was not subject to Coast Guard
disciplinary jurisdiction.2 0 1 Similarly, where no hearing has been conducted,
a district court will not enjoin a Coast Guard proceeding on grounds of
agency bias or alleged inadequacy of the time allowed for preparation of
a defense.20 2 Issues not raised before the administrative agency will not be
entertained on judicial review. 203
Some interlocutory matters may be brought properly to a district
court. In Ingham v. Smith,20 4 an action to review the revocation of a
merchant mariner's document for possession of marijuana, the court di-
rected the Commandant to issue a temporary document to the plaintiff
pending judicial review. Whether this assistance from the court, like de-
cisions to grant bail in a criminal case 205 or issue a preliminary injunc-
tion,200 is a function of the likelihood of a litigant's success on the merits
cannot be determined from the court's opinion; in this case the Com-
mandant prevailed. In another case, Miller v. Smith,207 the Commandant
obtained interlocutory relief from the district court in the form of a protec-
tive order against an interrogatory posed by the plaintiff which requested
access to memoranda of the now-defunct Permanent Board to Hear Oral
Argument.
199. Word v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Ala. 1963), noted in 332
U.S. COAST GUARD L. BULL. 19 (1963). But see Popham v. Arzt, 1960 A.M.C. 987
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), noted in 288 U.S. COAST GUARD L. BuLL. 15 (1960); Perkins
v. Captain of the Port, 1961 A.M.C. 1271 (D. Md. 1961) (semble). See also Harris
v. Smith, 1969 A.M.C. 1921 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 418 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1969) (no
right to counsel at time of voluntary surrender); Hasler v. United States, 1972
A.M.C. 2185 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (voluntary surrender set aside where Coast Guard
misled mariner, finding deprivation of statutory right to counsel).
200. See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 803 U.S. 41 (1938).
201. Cabales v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afrd, 412
F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1969); Miller v. Siler, Civ. No. 75-308 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 1975);
McDevitt v. Gunn, 182 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
202. Colucci v. Carpenter, 47 F.R.D. 549, 551, 1968 A.M.C. 28356, 2358-59
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
203. See Christen v. N.T.S.B., No. 78-3500, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. May 25,
1979), quoting United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952).
204, 274 F. Supp. 137, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Commandant v. Burke,
2 N.T.S.B. 2784, 2787-88 (1976), noting Burke v. Bender, Civ. No. 74-H-1411
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 1974); Commandant v. Neves, 2 N.T.S.B. 2775 n.4 (1976)
(noting district court order requiring Commandant to return license pending
N.T.S.B. appeal).
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (b) (1976) ("weight of evidence against the accused"
is to be considered in setting conditions for pretrial release).
206. See, e.g., Virginia Petroleum Jobbers' Ass'n v. F.P.C., 259 F.2d 921 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
207. 292 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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When necessary, the district courts have displayed a willingness to
place their powers at the service of the Coast Guard for the purpose of
enforcing agency subpoenas, whether at the request of the presiding of-
ficer 20 8 or the respondent. 209 The courts have acted to enforce subpoenas
duces tecum210 as well as subpoenas ad testificandum,2 11 although a mer-
chant mariner's document itself may not be subpoenaed unless it is re-
quired as evidence in the case.2 12 On the whole, the courts have been co-
operative with Coast Guard hearings as to interlocutory matters, providing
contrast to the course they have set in the area of collateral review.
Given a reviewable action by either the Commandant or the Safety
Board, and assuming available administrative remedies have been ex-
hausted, the practitioner will be faced initially with the task of finding a
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, and in
which venue can properly be laid. Before the Independent Safety Board
Act of 1974 was passed, the usual course was for the seaman to seek re-
view by the district court in the district of his residence or in which the
R.S. 4450 hearing had been held; an approach that for some years ef-
fectively shut off review for a variety of reasons.21 3
These obstacles to review21 4 were removed through the passage of
the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962.215 Under section 1391 (e) of the
208. In re Merchant Mariners Documents Issued to Dimitratos, 91 F. Supp.426 (N.D. Cal. 1949). The request for judicial enforcement of a subpoena is in-
stituted by letter to the cognizant United States Attorney. 417 U.S. CoAST GUARD
L. BULL. 2-3 (1979). Agency subpoenas not so enforced cannot be the basis for a
civil penalty as a contempt. Id.
209. Ismail v. Isbrantsen Co., 1951 A.M.C. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
210. In re License 60376, 1950 A.M.C. 1647 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
211. Ismail v. Isbrantsen Co., 1951 A.M.C. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
212. In re License 60376, 1950 A.M.C. 1647 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
213. The Commandant was thought to be an indispensable party to the action.
See Perkins v. Captain of Port, supra note 199 (dismissing appeal on grounds
that only Commandant could reissue documents involved in the dispute); Popham
v. Arzt, 1960 A.M.C. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (reaching a similar result as in Perkins
where defendant was the senior investigating officer at the Marine Inspection
Office in New York). See also Provenzano v. Richmond, 1960 A.M.C. 985 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), noted in 288 U.S. CoAsT GUARD L. BULL. 15 (1960) (held that service of
process on a Captain in Coast Guard Headquarters would not suffice as service
on the Commandant); Warren v. Arzt, 18 F.R.D. 11, 1955 A.M.C. 2024 (S.D.N.Y.
1955), noted in 233 U.S CoAsT GUARD L. BULL. 12 (1955) (FD. R. Civ. P. 4 (d)(4)
requires service on U.S. Attorney and Attorney General in addition to agency). But
see Colucci v. Carpenter, 47 F.R.D. 549, 550, 1968 A.M.C. 2356, 2357 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (failure to serve not fatal where U.S. Attorney appeared for all defendants).
See generally Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "NVonstatutory" Judicial Review:
Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1479,
1493-99 (1962).
214. E.g., effecting personal service on the Commandant in Washington, D.C.,
held void when process issued out of district court in New York. Provenzano v.
Richmond, 1960 A.M.C. 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Popham v. Arzt, 1960 A.M.C. 987(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) (1976), discussed in Jacoby, The Effect of Recent
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Code it is now possible to secure jurisdiction over the Commandant by
service of process in the form of certified mail. As a result, it is still de-
sirable to name the Commandant as a party if the case does not involve
review of a Safety Board decision. Doing so, however, will now not involve
an attempt to use the process of a court beyond its limits. Despite a quaere
as to venue in Miller v. Smith,21 6 section 1391 (e) seems to have done its
job so well that the issue of venue is almost never mentioned in the post-
1962 cases. 217
More fundamental than venue is the subject matter jurisdiction of the
reviewing court. At times the district courts had taken a mechanical ap-
proach in this regard, and had looked more at the form of the action than
the merits. The early case of In re Soto,218 unsuccessful for other reasons,
was styled a petition to review and an order to show cause. In Warren v.
Arzt,2 10 which arose as a petition for a show cause order, the district court
felt constrained to remind the plaintiff that the proper method for com-
mencing an action for judicial review of an agency order was the familiar
technique of serving the summons and complaint on the defendants.
Actions for review have occasionally been cast in the mandamus mold.
Thus, in Popham v. Arzt,220 Judge Levet noted that "the complaint must
be viewed in the nature of mandamus," 221 and denied relief, among other
reasons, because the district court did not then possess mandamus jurisdic-
tion.222 This obstacle was also eliminated by the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962, which, in addition to expanding venue as noted above, con-
ferred jurisdiction "in the nature of mandamus" upon all district courts. 2 23
Consequently, since 1962, cases couched in the language of mandamus
have not failed on the jurisdictional question.224
Section 10 of the APA was long thought to be an alternative source
of jurisdiction to section 1361. Before the Supreme Court held that section
10 is not a grant of jurisdiction to the district courts, 225 courts in R.S. 4450
cases had consistently sustained jurisdiction "under" the Act.2 2 6 Some
216. 292 F. Supp. at 56.
217. Venue was specifically approved by the court in Rechany v. Roland, 235
F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
218. 73 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
219. 18 F.R.D. 11, 1955 A.M.C. 2024 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
220. 1960 A.M.C. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
221. Id. at 988.
222. See M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), discussed in Byse
& Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatu-
tory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARv. L. REv. 308,
310-13 (1967).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
224. Ingham v. Smith, 274 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Jennings v. Smith,
280 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), noted in 378-79 U.S. COAST GUARD L. BULL. 6
(1967).
225. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
226. See, e.g., Wheatley v. Shields, 292 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Rechany
v. Roland, 235 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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courts even treated matters under section 10 which, because they requested
mandatory injunctive relief, could have been viewed as section 1361 cases. 227
In Ingham v. Smith228 the opinion referred to an "action in the nature
of mandamas [sic] brought under" the APA,22 9 thus running together the
section 10 and section 1361 bases for jurisdiction.
Evcen after the rejection of section 10 as a grant of jurisdiction, counsel
for an R.S. 4450 respondent should encounter no difficulty in finding a
court with jurisdiction to review a decision of either the Commandant or
the Safety Board. If, as will generally now be the case, review is sought of
a decision of the Safety Board (rather than of the Commandant), the
proper course is for "any person disclosing a substantial interest in the
order" to file a petition for review in the "appropriate" United States
court of appeals or the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit.230 The petition must be filed within sixty days after
entry of the order on review.23 1 The Coast Guard appears to have no
right to seek judicial review of an adverse ruling of the Safety Board.2 32
Whether judicial review will ultimately benefit the mariner is another
matter. The following language from a license issuance case is instructive:
The courts have no authority to review the findings of the steam-
boat inspectors by appeal or writ of error. The most they can do
is to see that the inspectors act within their jurisdiction, and that
the constitutional and statutory rights of citizens are not im-
paired.238
Though the case is old, this language may still convey the flavor of ju-
dicial review of merchant marine hearings. While no one today would agree
that "there is serious doubt that ... [a] court has any authority to inter-
fere with" a decision of the Commandant 23 4 or the Safety Board, the avail-
ability of judicial review in R.S. 4450 cases generally has proven to be of
rather little practical value to persons charged. In point of fact, aside from
state pilotage cases where the courts have ruled that the mariner was not
sailing under the authority of his federal license (and hence was not sub-
ject to R.S. 4450 jurisdiction),2 38 the only respondents known to have
227. O'Kon v. Roland, 247 F. Supp. 743, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), noted in 359
U.S. CoAsT GUARD L. BULL. 11 (1966).
228. 274 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
229. Id. at 138.
230. 49 U.S.C. § 1903 (d) (1976).
231. Id.
232. See Lee v. CAB, 225 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (reaching this conclusion
in an airman's case; court split two to one), cited in Hamilton, Administrative
Practice in Aviation Medical Proceedings, 26 EMoRY L.J. 565, 585 n.110 (1977).
233. Williams v. Potter, 223 F. 423, 424 (2d Cir. 1915), aff'g 210 F. 318
(N.D.N.Y. 1913).
234. In re Soto, 73 F. Supp. 725, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), citing 11 Fed. Reg. 13971
(1946).
235. Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974); Dietze v. Siler,
414 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. La. 1976).
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succeeded in securing permanent judicial reversal of a modem 230 American
merchant marine administrative decision were the plaintiffs in Clinton v.
Commandant, 37 Rechany v. Roland,238 and Van Teslaar v. Bender.230
The reason for this pattern of successes in court by the government is
the very narrow scope of review powers conferred upon the courts. Review
is limited to determining whether the agency decision is supported by sub-
stantial, reliable and probative evidence based on the record as a whole.2 40
In Wheatley v. Shields,24 1 for instance, a Coast Guard decision was sus-
tained because there was substantial evidence "upon which a reasonable
mind could properly arrive at the conclusion reached. '242 In applying this
test the courts have consistently distinguished the scope of agency review
from the scope of review exercised by an appellate court with regard to
a trial court,243 or from the supposed result if the court had been em-
powered, to make a de novo ruling on the record.244 These principles are
236. Appellants from decisions of the predecessor agencies seem to have been
more successful in obtaining judicial review. See Fisher v. Alwen, 290 F. 8 (9th
Cir. 1923), aff'g 279 F. 164 (W.D. Wash. 1922); Bulger v. Benson, 262 F. 929 (9th
Cir. 1920), aff'g 251 F. 757 (W.D. Wash. 1918), discussed in Decision on Appeal
No. 891 (1956) and Decision on Appeal No. 1574 (1966); Fredenberg v. Whitney,
240 F. 819 (W.D. Wash. 1917); Joyce v. Bulger, 240 F. 817 (W.D. Wash. 1916).
237. Civ. No. 63-577-S (S.D. Cal. Mar. 31 and Apr. 7, 1965). Judge Stephens
set aside a Commandant decision in a case involving a charge that a license
renewal had been secured by means of a false statement. The court made' factual
findings at odds with those of the Commandant, and concluded that no false
statement had in fact been made by the mariner. The case is discussed in the
administrative law judge's opinion in Commandant v. O'Callaghan, No. ME-58
(N.T.S.B. July 29, 1977).
238. 235 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
239. 365 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Md. 1973) (unjustified change of hearing examiners
during hearing).
240. The record on review includes the transcript of proceedings before the
administrative law judge, his decision and order and associated documents, and
decisions of the Commandant and Safety Board. It has been held not to include
memoranda prepared by the members of the board that formerly heard oral argu-
nient. Miller v. Smith, 292 F. Supp. 55, 57-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Ingham v. Smith,
274 F. Supp. 137, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Rechany v. Roland, 235 F. Supp. 79, 81 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1964). The transcript taken before the latter board may, however, con-
stitute a portion of the record. Ingham v. Smith, 274 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
In Britain and Canada, in contrast, the reviewing court may take new evidence,
even as to events occurring after the decision being appealed. See BRITISH RuLE
20 (h), at 539; CANADIAN Rur 14, at 429.
241. 292 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
242. See also Ingham v. Smith, 274 F. Supp. 137, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
243. O'Kon v. Roland, 247 F. Supp. 743, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
244. Compare Wheatley v. Shields, 292 F. Supp. 608, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) with
Craddock v. Minister of Transport, [1948] Ex. C.R. 501, 506. The broader'scope
of review in Canada probably reflects both an expansive concept of the "record
on review," see note 240 supra, and the availability of technical expertise to the
reviewing court in the form of assessors with maritime qualifications. See CANADIAN
RULE 11, at 428. Where a technical matter of seaman's judgment is concerned,
the assessor's decision will be given considerable weight. See, e.g., In re Merchant
Shipping Acts, 80 Ll. L. Rep. 692, 698 (Adm. Div. 1947); The Corchester, [1956]
3 All E.R. 878, 890 (Adm. Div.). But see Afran Transport. Co. v. S.S. Transcol6rado,
458 F.2d 164, 170-71 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1972) (district judge held "entitled to receive
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illustrated by Rechany, where the central question was whether a purser
had committed an act of misconduct by entering a female passenger's
stateroom for reasons unrelated to the passenger's welfare or safety. The
court held "substantial evidence to support [the critical] finding is wholly
lacking."245 Admittedly Judge Bryan's extended comment on the evidence
considered by the hearing examiner and the Commandant suggests a broad-
ranging and energetic review, but the case may equally be viewed as an
application of the "no evidence" rule established by the Supreme Court in
Thompson v. Louisville246 because the district court found no basis for
the examiner's central finding.
The concept of "probative evidence" may be used defensively by the
government in R.S. 4450 cases, as in Jennings v. Smith,247 where the re-
viewing court noted that no such evidence had been adduced by the
respondent in support of a request to the Commandant for permission to
file an untimely notice of appeal from an examiner's decision. Related cate-
gories of "arbitrary and capricious" agency action are corollaries of the
evidentiary scope of review rules, and may apply more specifically to cases
involving attacks on the regulatory process, as opposed to actions to review
findings of fact and the application of legal standards to such findings.248
In view of the consistency with which courts have sustained the ad-
ministrative agency in suspension and revocation proceedings, the reported
cases offer little cause for rejoicing among defense counsel seeking to re-
verse findings and orders under R.S. 4450. Where a relatively lenient order
has been entered, involving no period of "outright" suspension of a docu-
ment or license, the economics of the situation effectively may preclude
seeking review.
To some extent the decision to seek review may also be a function of
the type of alleged conduct or condition that gave rise to the Coast Guard
hearing. For example, a reviewing court will be better able to decide a
case, and therefore arguably more likely to reverse a decision, that involves
a'revocation based upon a state or federal conviction for a narcotics viola-
tion than one involving a charge of negligence leading to a collision,
grounding or boiler casualty. In the former situation, there is little reason
for a reviewing court to defer to an agency decision that a state court is
or is not a "court of record" for purposes of the narcotics revocation
statute.249 The closer the inquiry approaches highly technical factual or
and consider the report and findings [of C. Z. Board of Local Inspectors] somewhat
like his English Brothers would the assistance of the Elder Brethren of Trinity
House"), but where an assessor ventures to use lawyers' language the contrary
may result. See In re Merchant Shipping Acts, 80 Ll. L. Rep. at 694-95 (argument
of counsel).
245. 235 F. Supp. at 84.
246. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
247. 290 F. Supp. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
248. See, e.g., id.; Word v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Ala. 1965).
249. 46 U.S.C. §§ 239a-b (1976).
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interpretive matters, the more likely it becomes that a court will rely
upon and defer to the expertise of the agency.
On the other hand, federal courts sitting in admiralty have confronted
difficult, technical, and "salty" issues since the earliest days of the Re-
public. 250 A charge of negligent management of a propulsion system simi-
larly would not make an impossible demand on a court which regularly
hears negligence matters as part of its diversity jurisdiction. Consequently,
it is as difficult to indicate the contexts in which R.S. 4450 decisions may
enjoy a special weight on judicial review as it is to make a similar judgment
as to the court's posture in cases involving a review of any agency's actions.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In a time of increasing concern over the proliferation of federal
regulatory programs, there can be little question as to the need for an
administrative mechanism for ensuring personnel competence and suita-
bility in the merchant fleet. Issues of crew competence are becoming
increasingly critical to vessel owners and operators. Greater capital invest-
ment in more sophisticated ships and equipment, coupled with the imposi-
tion of increasingly strict liability for pollution-causing accidents will place
a premium on professional conduct by master and crew alike. The stakes
are bigger, and management and labor require a rational, comprehensive
and well-organized administrative process for governance of crew licensing
and conduct.
Whether the same is true with respect to disciplinary actions is not
as clear. It is tempting to suggest that purely disciplinary issues should be
relegated to the criminal justice system subject only to the power of the
vessel master to take immediate action at sea. Beyond this, there are several
specific areas where changes in the R.S. 4450 program could profitably be
considered.
Suspension and revocation proceedings should have greater impact on
the persons being regulated. In some ports the conclusion has been reached
by mariners that misconduct or incompetence will be overlooked by the
Coast Guard. As in any prosecutorial scheme, there is an unavoidable ele-
ment of discretion in selecting cases for R.S. 4450 hearings. Not every
case can be followed through to a hearing, nor should every case be
brought before an administrative law judge. However, in those cases se-
lected for prosecution, more stringent orders than have generally been
250. For example, one may wonder how far a reviewing court should defer to
agency expertise in deciding whether a respondent has been "aired" for purposes
of the narcotics provisions, given the fact that the legislative history suggests that
the test for "cure" is drawn from the traditional admiralty doctrine of main-
tenance and cure. See Revocation or Denial of Seamen's Documents to Narcotics
Law Violators: Hearing on H.R. 8538 Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. CommZ on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1954) (testimony of
Capt. James D. Craik, Chief, Merchant Vessel Personnel Div., U.S. Coast Guard).
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entered will help to vindicate the interest of the government and the mari-
time industries in the safety of life and property at sea. Orders requiring
additional or remedial training could also be considered.
Even if R.S. 4450 hearings are properly described as remedial, the
deterrent effect of an order on other mariners should be considered by the
presiding administrative law judge. For this deterrent effect to be felt,
however, orders should be better published among mariners, rather than
the present reliance on the harbor "grapevine" for dissemination of hear-
ing results. Wider dissemination could be accomplished by the prepara-
tion and distribution in every Coast Guard district, for example, of a
quarterly summary-in plain English-of decisions rendered. Responsible
labor organizations, which have already shown substantial interest in aid-
ing the cause of shipboard discipline and safety in many cases, should
also be encouraged to carry home to their members the serious conse-
quences of misconduct, negligence, or violation of the law. Close contact
between union locals and Marine Inspection or Marine Safety Offices al-
ready exists in joint supervision of the payment of earnings to mariners.
This avenue of communication should be nurtured to maximize the role
of the unions as allies in the campaign for shipboard safety and discipline.
'The rights of respondents in suspension and revocation hearings should
be scrupulously protected. The adverse consequences of an administrative
law judge's order or of a voluntary surrender to avoid a hearing have been
suggested early in this article. Since Coast Guard hearings are funda-
mentally adversary proceedings, the two sides should start out on sub-
stantially the same footing. Most notably, there should be a rethinking of
the issue of a right to free lawyer counsel for indigent seamen, and of the
issue of a right to counsel at the investigatory and voluntary surrender
stages. Additionally, legal aid societies and local bar associations should
be 'encouraged to make their members available upon request for Coast
Guard hearings. The availability and effectiveness of legal assistance from
the bar, however, probably will be reduced if the procedures and pre-
cedents remain scattered and undefined, leaving assigned attorneys with
the unfortunate task of trying to unravel this arcane area of law. Look-
ing to the government side, the disciplinary process also would be as-
sisted by the assignment of additional officers with legal training to
marin'e 'nspection investigative functions, particularly as mariners avail
themselves increasingly of lawyer counsel.
Related to the right to counsel is the role of precedent in Coast Guard
hearings. Since one purpose of the doctrine of stare decisis is to provide
notice to regulated persons of the likelihood of adverse administrative
action, the continued growth of a body of thoughtful precedent should be
encouraged. The Safety Board's decisions, as well as those of the Com-
mandant, already show an understanding of the value of precedent.
Expanded distribution and speedier publication of Commandant and
Safety Board decisions under R.S. 4450 would be desirable, and could be
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accomplished through an expansion of the editorial policies of American
Maritime Cases or the Proceedings of the Marine Safety Council, a Coast
Guard publication. Decisions on Appeal not reviewed by the Safety Board
should, in particular, be the subject of a formal reporting service. Con-
tinued maintenance of the Coast Guard's index to R.S. 4450 decisions on
a current basis will also be useful in this connection.
One area in which a reevaluation is long overdue is the Table of
Average Orders. A mariner subject to governmental sanctions which could
result in a loss of his livelihood is entitled to more accurate notice of the
possible consequences of his misconduct than the Table currently provides.
The Table is stale and should be either updated or scrapped.
Finally, the evidentiary status of log entries could be reconsidered.
While the present statute affords a semblance of confrontation rights,
preparation of the entry by one who may well be an interested party raises
a substantial issue as to the fairness of the doctrine giving the entry prima
facie weight. Despite the special status the law has long afforded to log
entries, the use of such entries as evidence should be restricted to the rare
case where the author cannot conveniently be deposed, and even then
should comport with standards similar to those governing proffers of
business records into evidence. The balance between the need to keep
vessels moving in commerce and the mariner's right to be confronted by
adverse witnesses can properly be reexamined to this extent without detri-
ment to the needs of the industry.
A continuing search for further ways to rationalize the legislative and
administrative framework should be conducted. Because of the haphazard
way in which federal maritime safety policy has developed, the statutes and
regulations are laden with anomalies and antiquities. For example, there
is no reason that charges of violations of statute or regulation under sec-
tion 239 (g) should today be limited to Title 52 of the Revised Statutes and
regulations issued thereunder, 25' since in any event they can be charged
as misconduct. The needless complications surrounding the exercise of
federal jurisdiction over pilots sailing under the authority of state li-
censes25 2 should be corrected by legislation. 253 Malpractice as a pilot-
251. 46 C.F.R. § 5.05-20 (b) (1979). For example, violation of various federal
environmental laws should be chargeable as violations of law rather than as mis-
conduct, as is presently done. See Fidell, Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976: The Policeman's Lot, supra note 3, at 538 n.184,
citing United States v. License No. 87816 (Cox), No. ll-0056-HJG-75 (11th Coast
Guard Dist. Nov. 4, 1975) (charge of misconduct based upon harassment of seal
in violation of Marine Mammal Protection Act); United States v. License No.
438175 (Conners), No. l1-044-HJG-74 (11th Coast Guard Dist. Oct. 22, 1974).
252. See, e.g., Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1974); Herring
v. Bender, Civ. No. 73-3860 (D. Haw. June 19, 1974); Dietze v. Siler, 414 F. Supp.
1105 (E.D. La. 1976); 5 U.S. CoAsT GUARD, MARINE SAFETY MANUAL art. 71-6-35A.
253. Such legislation has been urged by the Comptroller General, GAO Re-
port, supra note 50, at 58-61, proposed by the Administration and passed by. the
Senate. S. No. 682, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The cognizant House committee
conducted hearings but declined to report a bill "since none of the advocates of
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whether serving under a state license or not-fairly raises a question as
to whether the individual's federal license should be withdrawn.
The process of eliminating anomalies also requires that procedures for
the disposition of wages and effects of deserting seamen be changed. The
decision in the R.S. 4450 case should be given greater weight in "turn-
over" proceedings in district court, or the Coast Guard's administrative
law judges should be given the district court's present jurisdiction over
wages and effects. 254 The latter approach would leave to the courts a re-
viewing role and would lessen the possibility of different results in "turn-
over" and R.S. 4450 proceedings arising out of the same facts. The long-
awaited overhaul of Title 46 of the United States Code should address
itself to this problem. In addition, the suspension and revocation regula-
tions generally should be simplified and updated and disciplinary pro-
cedures should be identical for Great Lakes pilots and all other mariners
subject to Coast Guard and National Transportation Safety Board juris-
diction.
Most importantly, suspension and revocation procedures should be
subject to more regular study. The inquiry should look beyond the Coast
Guard's own experience to that of other federal regulatory bodies and the
solutions found by other maritime nations to the problems of marine dis-
cipline and safety. For example, it may be desirable and cost-effective to
expand the Coast Guard's present limited program of assigning marine
inspectors to selected merchant vessels, just as observers have been placed
on foreign fishing vessels to monitor compliance with the Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976,255 or for that matter, much like
the Coast Guard's own "resident inspector" program at shipyards. Should
the cost of such assignments or industry resistance be obstacles, observers
could be assigned to those vessels routinely experiencing crew problems,
assuming this can be done without subverting the function of the master.
As more cases are reviewed by the National Transportation Safety
Board and the courts, further areas of needed change may appear. To
what extent, for example, will NTSB decisions on appeals from airman and
the changes provided specific details or statistics to support their position for
changes." Report on the Activities of the [House] Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. no. 95-G, 271-72 (1979).
254. Attention could also be given to the desirability of expanding the juris-
diction of the Coast Guard's administrative law judges to include not only dis-
putes over the issuance of licenses and documents, see note 159 supra, but also
the administrative adjudication of violations of § 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1321 (b) (6), (j) (2) (1976), and other civil penalty statutes. At present
such penalties are imposed by commissioned officers of the Coast Guard. 33 C.F.R.
§§ 1.07-9, 153.105 (a) (1), (4), 153.107 (1979). These penalty regulations are being
revised. 418 U.S. COAST GUARU L. BULL. 21 (1979).
255. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (c) (2) (D) (1976); 50 C.F.R. § 611.8 (1978). See also
Fidell, Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976:
The Policeman's Lot, supra note 3, at 580 8c n.364. But see 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.70 (b),
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marine cases define a single cohesive body of law? And is it necessary, on
balance, to have two levels of agency review in cases subject to the APA
before a mariner may obtain judicial review? Does a two-tiered system,
when coupled with the exhaustion doctrine, unfairly restrict access to the
courts? Does it take too long for a case to proceed from initial hearing to
Safety Board decision?250
Taken together, the foregoing comments suggest the need for a fresh
look at R.S. 4450 in its entirety. The Department of Transportation has
already gone on record that "a literal reading of R.S. 4450 no longer re-
flects the state of the law," and that the provision is "stylistically ar-
chaic." 257 A reading of the terms of the statute, reproduced at the begin-
ning of this article, confirms the accuracy of both of these remarks. It is
not clear that the revision proposed by the Department2 58 is in all respects
256. See, e.g., Commandant v. Ernser, No. ME-67 (N.T.S.B. Dec. 1, 1978)(administrative law judge's decision and order entered May 24, 1976; Decision on
Appeal entered Jan. 31, 1977; Safety Board opinion and order served Dec. 11,
1978). Between 1974 and 1977, the average interval between the date of appeal to
the Safety Board and the date of service of the Board's final order ranged from
9-12 months. Coast Guard Miscellaneous: Hearings on Tanker Safety Before the
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. no. 95-14, 303 (1977) (testimony of
Kay Bailey, Acting Chmn., N.T.S.B.).
257. See Letter from John G. Wofford, Acting Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of
Transp., to Rep. John M. Murphy, Chinn., House Comm. on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, May 11, 1978, Attachment II, at 1, in H.R. Rep. No. 95-1384, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 34, 38 (1978) (unpublished attachment on file at Univer-
sity of Missouri Law Review, Columbia, Mo.). For an illustration of the textual
difficulties with R.S. 4450, one need only refer to the fact that, read literally, the
law provides for appeals to the Commandant from decisions of the Commandant.
258. (k) Suspension and revocation: To promote safety at sea and to pro-
tect the navigable waters of the United States, any license, certificate of
registry or merchant mariner's document issued to a person under title
52 of the Revised Statutes or laws amendatory or supplementary thereto,
may be suspended or revoked by the Secretary after notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing. Hearings for such purposes shall be in accordance.
with sections 551 through 559 of title 5, United States Code.(1) Basis for orders of suspension or revocation: The basis for orders
of suspension or revocation authorized under this section are that the
holder-
(1) is physically, mentally, or professionally incompetent;
(2) is physically or mentally incapacitated to perform his duties;
(3) has, whether or not he was at the time of the act or omission acting
under the authority of his license, certificate of registry, or merchant
mariners document-
(i) willfully violated or failed to comply with any law or regulation
relating to the promotion of marine safety or the protection of
the navigable waters of the United States;
(ii) committed an act of misconduct or negligence while in the serv-
ice of a vessel;
(iii) committed an act, related to the performance of duties, which
is of such a nature as to render him unfit or unsuitable to re-
tain the license, certificate of registry, or merchant mariner's
document.
Attachment II, supra note 257, at 5-6.
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desirable,2 59 and it certainly does not address a number of the problems
here identified. Nevertheless, it definitely can serve a useful purpose by
providing a catalyst for further discussion. The matter clearly merits de-
tailed attention in Congress.
The American merchant marine only can be as productive and de-
pendable as its personnel. Currently the merchant fleet is experiencing a
crisis in attracting and retaining mariners of high personal and professional
calibre. In order to retain those already committed to the sea and to at-
tract others, as well as to insure the safety of life and property at sea, the
quality of shipboard life must be improved. This responsibility cannot be
met by government alone. Therein lies the challenge to the marine trans-
portation industry as a whole.
259. For example, the language in proposed § 4450 (k) making suspension and
revocation hearings subject to 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976) obviously requires addi-
tional reflection: Why should there be any reference here to rulemaking provisions,§§ 553, 556-557, in connection with these unmistakably adjudicatory licensing
proceedings? If the intent was to grant rulemaking powers, this will have already
been done by the second sentence of subsection (a).
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